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INTRODUCTION
The history of business reorganization under the bankruptcy law in
the United States, similar to other areas of law, demonstrates the use
of innovative and creative techniques to achieve the intended
1
objectives and policies of a particular statute. Rarely is a statute
enacted that encompasses all potential scenarios that may thereafter
arise and affect its stated and perceived goals. The application of
statutory provisions necessarily involves the construction of their
words in the context of the purposes and policies of the legislation.
Perhaps there is no area of law more dynamic and needful of
enlightened
and
flexible
construction
than
bankruptcy
reorganization. Bankruptcy reorganizations present socio-economic
circumstances and processes that are layered with multiple parties
1. See John M. Czarnetzky, Time, Uncertainty, and the Law of Corporate
Reorganizations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2969 (1999) (commenting on the
evolution of Bankruptcy Law in the United States since its humble beginnings in the
early 19th Century).
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and diverse interests. Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act in 1978, reorganization professionals have grappled with the
construction of Bankruptcy Code provisions in order to affect the
underlying principles and policies of that statute. In the specific area
of Chapter 11 reorganizations, the effort has been devoted to
achieving the confirmation of a reorganization plan that would
rehabilitate a debtor’s business and maximize the value of the
2
debtor’s estate for the benefit of its economic stakeholders.
Attainment of the statutory objectives has required a flexible
approach to the interpretation and application of the Bankruptcy
3
Code.
The creativity of professionals has been of significant
importance in persuading courts to construe and apply the
Bankruptcy Code and its related statutory provisions in a manner that
satisfies the legislation’s objectives.
The confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may
present circumstances that call for creative thinking and
constructions that serve the process of reorganization.
The
challenges become more acute in the context of confirming a
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization over the objection of a class of
4
dissenting creditors through the use of the “cramdown” power. The
cramdown power implicates the Fair and Equitable Rule or Absolute
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, which are
5
incorporated into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The
Absolute Priority Rule is a vertical test designed to ensure that no
creditor or interest junior to the objecting class of creditors receives
any consideration under the plan on account of such junior claims or
6
interests if the objecting class of creditors is not paid in full. The
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition is a horizontal test designed to
ensure that no class of equal priority or standing to the objecting
class of creditors receives a consideration under the plan that is

2. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship., 526 U.S.
434, 453 (1999) (recognizing that the two goals of Chapter 11 are “preserving going
concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors”).
3. See William C. Whitford, What’s Right About Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1379,
1406 (1994) (proclaiming that the malleability of Chapter 11 is one of its greatest
virtues).
4. See infra Part I.B (discussing the requirement for plan approval via
“cramdown”).
5. See infra Part I.B (discussing the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and the
Absolute Priority Rule set forth in section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code).
6. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall
and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988) (providing
an overview of the Absolute Priority Rule).
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better than the consideration provided for the objecting class of
7
creditors.
Although the policies underlying the Absolute Priority Rule and
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition are self-evident, often these
two rules are confused and impair the ability of parties to reach
consensus. In some circumstances, creditors may want to give equity
interest holders some consideration in order to retain the old
management to continue to operate and manage the reorganized
business, or they may want to give a particular class of creditors
additional consideration to avoid threatened litigation by that class or
for other reasons.
A strict construction of the cramdown
requirements may lead to the conclusion that such arrangements
cannot be sanctioned if there is an objecting class of creditors.
Flexibility and creativity on the part of the professionals and the
courts often become imperative and necessary to affect the
reorganization of distressed businesses and deal fairly with the parties
in interest. Relying on a line of cases that permitted a secured
creditor to share collateral proceeds with other classes of creditors,
plan proponents have argued and reasoned that if an enhanced
recovery to one class of claims or interest were necessary to effect the
confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan and that enhanced recovery was
provided by a non-debtor, e.g., a vendor, from that non-debtor’s
recovery or property, the Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition should not prevent confirmation of the
8
plan. Thus came to be the “gifting” doctrine.
It developed
incrementally. Initially a secured creditor shared the proceeds from
its collateral security with unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7
9
liquidation case. Then, a secured creditor shared proceeds from its
collateral security with unsecured creditors in the context of a
10
Chapter 11 plan. Next, a secured creditor shared proceeds from its
collateral security with equity interest holders as part of the
11
consummation of a plan.
Finally, a class of unsecured creditors
proposed to share with an equity interest holder a portion of its
distribution in order to confirm a plan of reorganization and not
7. See generally Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in
Chapter 11, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 228 (1998) (examining the origins of the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition).
8. See infra Part III (tracing the history of the gifting doctrine).
9. See infra Part III.B (discussing Official, Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v.
Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993)).
10. See infra Part III.C.4 (discussing In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., 1994 WL
842777 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994)).
11. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R.
591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)).
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implicate the Absolute Priority Rule or the Unfair Discrimination
12
Prohibition. It is this most recent expansion of the gifting doctrine
that is the primary subject of this Article.
Courts have generally permitted gifting arrangements by citing to
the cases that have approved similar schemes, with the recognition,
perhaps, that creative deal-making that enables a distressed debtor to
emerge from Chapter 11 as a reorganized economic unit is a good
result. Unfortunately, it appears that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has squelched the creative efforts to facilitate
Chapter 11 plan confirmations by its textually oriented decision in In
13
re Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (Armstrong II). In that decision the
Third Circuit held that a Chapter 11 plan pursuant to which one class
of unsecured creditors gifted a portion of its plan consideration to an
equity interest holder while another class of unsecured creditors of
co-equal priority was to receive less than 100% satisfaction of their
14
claims violated the Absolute Priority Rule. The Armstrong opinion
may have the effect of limiting potential constructive plan structures
used by reorganization professionals to achieve consensus among
substantially all of the diverse interests that may be involved in a
Chapter 11 reorganization. The decision of the Third Circuit may
encourage hold-out behavior by objecting creditors who may
complain about an agreement for the transfer of consideration by
one creditor class of claims or interests to junior classes, even though
the transfer has no direct effect on the value to be received by the
objecting creditors.
This Article discusses Armstrong in the context of the history of the
Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition. It
concludes that the Chapter 11 plan in Armstrong, and in similar cases
that used creative structuring to achieve substantial consensus as to
the distribution of value, should be encouraged as consistent with
both the objectives and the literal language of Chapter 11. This
Article contends that the Third Circuit was wrong in its conclusion
that the gifting in Armstrong violated the Absolute Priority Rule.
Alternatively, to the extent that the Absolute Priority Rule or the

12. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 320 B.R. 523 (E.D. Pa. 2004), aff’d, 432
F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005).
13. 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005).
14. Id. The proposed description of warrants to the Class 12 claimant and
ultimately to Armstrong Holdings, Inc. would have resulted in a distribution of the
warrants to the public stockholders of Armstrong Holdings, Inc. As described in the
Disclosure Statement, Armstrong Holdings, Inc., the public company, was to be
liquidated. That liquidation would result in the distribution of the warrants to the
Holdings’ stockholders. Id.
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Unfair Discrimination Prohibition can be read to prohibit gifting as
proposed in Armstrong, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code
to permit explicitly such gifting.
Part I of this Article discusses the policy and process of Chapter 11
plan confirmation. Part II of the Article discusses the history of the
Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.
Part III discusses the evolution of the gifting doctrine in the cases
leading up to Armstrong. Part IV discusses the Armstrong decision and
the reasons why it was erroneously decided.
I. BANKRUPTCY CODE POLICY AND CONFIRMATION REQUIREMENTS
The sine qua non of Chapter 11 reorganization is the engagement
and negotiation among parties in interest with the ultimate goal of a
15
consensual plan of reorganization. The Bankruptcy Code sets the
rules of the game.
The rules are designed to assist the
implementation of the principle of equality of distribution to
creditors of equal rank in accordance with their legal rights.
Nonetheless, within the statutory provisions there is elasticity for
innovative solutions to accommodate parties in interest as may be
necessary to achieve plan confirmation.
For years creative
restructuring professionals have pushed the bounds of the
Bankruptcy Code to achieve the objectives of reorganization. These
attempts have met with mixed results. Taking into account that
bankruptcy reorganization is a zero-sum game, valuation is a critical
factor for participation in the reorganization. Therefore, the party
outside the value band often will seek a means to upset the
agreement among other parties in the hope of extracting value for
16
itself. Dissidents will argue that the negotiated proposed plan fails
to meet the confirmation requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.
Adversary proceedings ensue and the issues often wind their way
through the appellate courts.
Generally in all matters involving the law, where a party stands
depends upon where it falls in the hierarchy of claims or interest.
The individual attorneys in a relatively small bankruptcy bar often
find themselves, alternatively, arguing for broad or narrow
constructions of the Bankruptcy Code depending upon whether their
15. See Ali M.M. Mojdehi, Appraising Postconfirmation Leaders: The Underutilized
Confirmation Requirement, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 199, 211 (2003) (noting the special
emphasis Chapter 11 places on consensual plan reorganization).
16. See generally Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 432-33 (2005) (explaining that valuation is
used as a negotiating tool due to the strong incentives for the parties to reach an
agreement on valuation).
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clients are in or out of the value band under the pending proposed
plan. However, if the plan proponent is able to find a creative way to
shift value to the dissenting party, that party’s professionals will also
shift from arguing for a narrow interpretation of a particular statutory
provision to arguing that it should be broadly construed to permit
the transferred value to be paid to its client.
Creative professionals who convince courts to accept expansive
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code can change the battlefield.
This phenomenon may make consensus and an emergence from
Chapter 11 more attainable. Conversely, it is argued that the
seemingly straightforward policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code
(equality of similarly situated parties, adherence to priorities under
state law: secured creditors before senior creditors before junior
creditors before equity) are often barely identifiable in the ashes of
the give-and-take eggshell deal that is being proposed.
A. Requirements for Confirmation of a Consensual Plan
The Bankruptcy Code’s requirements for confirmation of a plan
are simple—at least on their face. Initially, the plan proponent must
classify all creditor claims and equity interests into separate classes for
purposes of voting and treatment.
There are two rules for
classification. First, to be in the same class, a claim or interest must
be “substantially similar to the other claims or interests of such
17
class.”
Second, claims or interests can be placed into separate
classes only if there is a “legitimate business reason” for the separate
18
classification and not for the purpose of creating an accepting class
19
of impaired creditors (a “gerrymander”).
Plan classification can be a game, and gerrymandering to achieve
certain results is a tool of the game, as the proponent’s goal is either
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000).
18. Boston Post Rd. Ltd. P’ship v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Boston Post Rd.
Ltd. P’ship), 21 F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994).
19. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Bus. Park Assocs., 987 F.2d
154, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 139
(5th Cir. 1992)) (“The one clear rule [that] emerges from otherwise muddled
caselaw on § 1122 claims classification” is that “thou shalt not classify similar claims
differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on a reorganization plan”);
see also G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Unresolved
Doctrines of Classification and Unfair Discrimination in Business Reorganizations Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 55 BUS. LAW. 1, 24-32 (1999) (discussing how classification rules first
appeared in the Bankruptcy Act, how they were interpreted by the Supreme Court,
and how they evolved through the legislative process into § 1122); Linda J. Rusch,
Gerrymandering The Classification Issue in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 163, 189-92 (1992) (explaining that, prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, claims of unsecured creditors could be divided into separate classes even if
such claims were “substantially similar”).
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to obtain votes to accept the plan from all impaired classes (a
“consensual” plan) or from at least one impaired accepting class (for
a “cramdown” plan). Creative restructuring professionals have
sought to expansively construe “substantially similar” or what is a
20
“legitimate reason” to achieve separate classification.
20. Most schemes for winning this classification game involve segregating
consenting and dissenting creditors to create an impaired class that would vote in
favor of the plan. In In re Boston Post Road, the debtor attempted two classification
maneuvers in an effort to cramdown its plan on its largest creditor. 21 F.3d at 480.
In that case the largest unsecured claim, by far, was the deficiency claim of the
secured creditor, which was opposed to the debtor’s proposed plan of
reorganization. Id. at 479. The first maneuver attempted by the debtor was to
classify the deficiency claim separately from the debtor’s other unsecured creditors.
Id. at 480. Creating two classes of unsecured creditors was done because the
deficiency claim was substantially larger than the claims of the other unsecured
creditors and if they were put into the same class it would have been “impossible for
the [d]ebtor to obtain the affirmative vote of two-thirds in amount of such class as
required by Section 1126(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. However, the court ruled
that the classification was impermissible, as it constituted improper gerrymandering
for the purpose of disenfranchising the overwhelmingly largest creditor. Id. at 483.
The second scheme tried by the debtor involved classifying a class of creditors as
impaired even though they were going to receive better treatment under the plan
than that to which they were entitled for their claims. Id. at 480. The debtor sought
to have this class of creditors count as the single class of impaired consenting
creditors required under the Bankruptcy Code. Ultimately, because this class of
creditors was found to not be entitled to vote for plan confirmation (because their
leases had not been assumed or rejected), the court did not need to decide whether
or not a class that was not worse off could be classified as “impaired.” Id. at 484.
Impairment is discussed infra at note 25.
The debtor in John Hancock tried a similar classification tactic by creating a
separate class for the unsecured deficiency claim of its undersecured creditors. See
987 F.2d at 156. Like in Boston Post Road, the court in John Hancock invalidated the
classification stating that:
[I]t seems clear that the Code was not meant to allow a debtor complete
freedom to place substantially similar claims in separate classes. The critical
confirmation requirements set out in [the Code] would be seriously
undermined if a debtor could gerrymander classes. A debtor could then
construct a classification scheme designed to secure approval by an
arbitrarily designed class of impaired claims even though the overwhelming
sentiment of the impaired creditors was that the proposed reorganization of
the debtor would not serve any legitimate purpose. This would lead to abuse
of creditors and would foster reorganizations that do not serve any broader
public interest.
Id. at 158. However, the court recognized that, at times, it was clearly reasonable to
separate similarly situated creditors into different classes. Id. For example, the court
recalled that it had endorsed the separate classification of medical malpractice
victims, employee benefit plan participants, and trade creditors in the reorganization
of a medical center. Id. at 159 (citing In re Jersey City Med. Ctr., 817 F.2d 1055, 1061
(3d Cir. 1987)).
Therefore, the classification game is about making the
gerrymandering look reasonable enough that it could be approved by the court. For
a court, like the one in John Hancock, that would mean that “each class must
represent a voting interest that is sufficiently distinct and weighty to merit a separate
voice in the decision whether the proposed reorganization should proceed.” Id. The
debtor in that case was unable to persuade the court that either of its proffered
justifications for separate classification (that the deficiency claim entitled the secured
creditors to unique rights and that combining the unsecured creditors together
would give too much power to the deficiency claim) were sufficient reasons to

MILLER

6/28/2006 9:15:42 PM

2006] STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE

1353

Once the claims and interests are classified, the plan proponent
solicits the acceptance of votes from all “impaired” classes entitled to
vote on the plan through the dissemination of a court approved
“disclosure statement” and ballots to all holders of claims and
21
interests in such classes. A class is unimpaired if the plan (i) “leaves
unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such
22
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest” or
(ii) cures any defaults, reinstates the maturity of the pre-petition
claim or interest, compensates the holder for any damages, and does
not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which
23
such claim or interest entitles the holder. Impairment (or “artificial
impairment”) is another area in the playground of creative
restructuring professionals because only impaired classes are entitled
24
to vote on the plan and, more importantly, to confirm a plan, at
least one impaired class of claims must vote to accept the plan
25
(without including acceptances by an insider).
approve the classification. Id. at 161.
Other courts have been more receptive to creative classification, even when the
result is plan confirmation over an objecting creditor. See, e.g., WHBA Real Est. Ltd.
P’ship v. Lafayette Hotel P’ship (In re Lafayette Hotel P’ship), 227 B.R. 445, 449
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that “reasonable grounds existed for placing API’s
unsecured claim into its own class given API’s significant non-creditor interests
relating to the Debtor’s reorganization and API’s continuous funding obligations
under the Plan”).
21. A disclosure statement is the bankruptcy equivalent of an SEC registration
statement. It is impermissible to solicit acceptances or rejections of a plan without a
disclosure statement approved by the court as containing “adequate information.”
11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2000). Adequate information is defined as “information of a
kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature
and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records, that
would enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or
interests of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the plan . . . .” 11
U.S.C. § 1125(a).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f).
[A] class that is not impaired under a plan, and each holder of a claim or
interest of such class, are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan,
and solicitation of acceptances with respect to such class from the holders of
claims or interests of such class is not required.
11 U.S.C. § 1126(f); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (stating that the court can
confirm a plan only “[i]f a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one
class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined
without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider”).
25. Because impairment is such a strict test, any alteration in a creditor’s
treatment, even a token alteration or an improvement, is considered an impairment.
See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int’l (In re L & J Anaheim Assocs.), 995
F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting Congressional intent to define impairment in
“the broadest possible terms”). As such, creative debtors and their attorneys have
discovered that they can create a consenting impaired class by isolating otherwise
consenting but unimpaired creditors into a separate class, then adjusting those
creditors’ recovery, making them impaired ever-so-slightly and thus eligible to vote.
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After the plan proponent solicits votes, it must demonstrate that it
has satisfied the thirteen requirements of section 1129(a) of the
26
Among those provisions are the voting
Bankruptcy Code.
requirements. First, as noted, section 1129(a)(10) provides that at
least one class of impaired claims must have voted to accept the plan
(without including the votes of insiders). Second, section 1129(a)(8)
provides that every class must either (i) be unimpaired or (ii) have
accepted the plan. A class of claims has accepted the plan if creditors
holding at least (i) two-thirds in amount and (ii) one-half in number
of the allowed claims in the class who have voted on the plan have
27
voted to accept the plan.

Although nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibits such behavior, courts have
found it inequitable and have deemed such “artificial impairment” impermissible;
however, courts have been divided on how much alteration in recovery should be
considered actual impairment. See Daniel J. Carragher, News at 11: Artificial
Impairment Revisited, 24-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Feb. 2005) (commenting on the
artificial impairment debate within the context of the Third Circuit’s opinion in In re
Combustion Eng’g Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Thus, some courts have allowed mere token alterations to satisfy section
1129(a)(10) regardless of the debtor’s motivation or the artificial nature of the
impairment. See In re Duval Manor Assocs., 191 B.R. 622, 626-29 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1996) (allowing for impairment of the barest imaginable degree to satisfy section
1129(a)(10), including a slight delay in payment of half of the recovery amount); In
re Witt, 60 B.R. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (considering payment of $1,600.00
under the plan as opposed to $1,675.00 owed as appropriate impairment); Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotel Assocs. of Tucson (In re Hotel Assocs. of Tucson), 165 B.R.
470, 474-75 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (finding a thirty-day delay in payment proper
impairment for § 1129(a)(10) but allowing for the motivation behind such token
impairment to be considered in looking at the good faith requirement).
In contrast, other courts have taken a hard line against “artificial impairment” by
not allowing it for purposes of obtaining an impaired consenting class under
§ 1129(a)(10). These courts have attempted to draw the line between impermissible
and permissible impairment. For example, one court held that “[a] class is
artificially impaired if a debtor intentionally alters the class members’ rights in order
to manipulate the voting process, but it is legitimately impaired if the creditors’
rights are altered for a proper business purpose.” Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge
Ltd. P’ship, 248 B.R. 668, 691 (D. Mass. 2000); see Windsor on the River Assocs. Ltd.
v. Balcor Real Est. Fin. Inc. (In re Windsor on the River Assocs. Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127, 131
(8th Cir. 1993) (holding that clear artificial impairment evidenced by the availability
of an alternative plan that would leave only the dissenting class impaired was not
permissible because, “[t]o allow manipulation of claims in a reorganization
proceeding under Chapter 11 would be contrary to the purpose of the provisions of
the bankruptcy code.”); In re Lettick Typografic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 39 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1989) (finding that, where the debtor’s plan delayed payment to a consenting
creditor by two weeks, “[w]hile the debtor may have achieved literal compliance with
§ 1129(a)(10), this engineered impairment so distorts the meaning and purpose of
that subsection that to permit it would reduce (a)(10) to a nullity”).
26. The plan proponent carries the burden of satisfying each requirement by a
preponderance of the evidence. Heartland Fed. Sav. Ass’n Enters. v. Briscoe Enters.
Ltd. II (In re Briscoe Enters. Ltd. II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1164-65 (5th Cir. 1993).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). A class of interest has accepted the plan if interest
holders holding at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed interests in the class who
have voted on the plan have voted to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(d).
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B. Requirements for Cramdown: Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and
Absolute Priority Rule
While section 1129(a) sets forth the requirements of a consensual
plan (i.e., one in which all impaired classes accept the plan), section
1129(b) permits the plan to be confirmed if requested by the plan
proponent, via “cramdown” if all the requirements of section 1129(a)
other than section 1129(a)(8) (acceptances by all impaired classes)
have been satisfied.
Specifically, section 1129(b)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that, if all requirements of section 1129(a)
other than section 1129(a)(8) are met and the plan proponent has
requested application of section 1129(b), the court shall confirm the
plan if it meets two requirements as to each impaired class of claims
or interests that has not accepted the plan. First, it cannot
“discriminate unfairly.” Second, it must be “fair and equitable.”
These two “cramdown” prerequisites are the Unfair Discrimination
Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule, respectively.
Because the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute
Priority Rule are set forth in section 1129(b), they only apply when
confirmation of a non-consensual plan is requested. Therefore, a
plan that discriminates unfairly or does not comply with the Absolute
Priority Rule is confirmable if the classes that are discriminated
against vote to accept the plan or the classes of higher priority who
are not paid in full vote to accept the plan despite a return being
28
provided to junior classes. As an initial matter, because it is the
exception that equity is unimpaired (and indeed, equity usually does
not participate in the reorganization value, it is generally deemed to
29
have rejected the plan), a plan proponent will always have to use
cramdown as to classes of equity interests. However, as described
below, compliance with absolute priority and lack of unfair
discrimination is relatively easy to establish when equity is the only
impaired rejecting class. Cramming down a class of creditors,
particularly an unsecured class of creditors, is the more interesting
scenario.

28. See In re Drimmel, 135 B.R. 410, 414 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating “the absolute
priority rule need not be satisfied if there is unanimous consent of the creditor
classes . . .”); Herbert Constr. Co., Inc. v. Greater N.Y. Sav. Bank (In re 455 CPW
Assocs.), 1999 WL 675972, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (overruling objection based on
Absolute Priority Rule because plan had consent of all creditor classes).
29. Section 1126(g) provides that “a class is deemed not to have accepted a plan
if such plan provides that the claims or interests of such class do not entitle the
holders of such claims or interests to receive or retain any property under the plan
on account of such claims or interests.”
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The Bankruptcy Code does not provide any guidance on the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, and as discussed in Part III below,
the case law has not set forth a uniform standard for determining
when the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition has been violated. Its
purpose, however, is fairly clear in light of the classification rules.
Because the Bankruptcy Code grants debtors some flexibility in how
30
it allocates its creditors into classes, this flexibility presents debtors
with the opportunity to “stack the deck” for voting purposes. The
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was developed to ensure that
(non-consenting) creditors were not being unfairly classified, isolated
from similarly situated creditors, and treated poorly relative to those
similar creditors (or favored creditors were not being similarly
isolated for the purposes of some sort of unjustified bonus recovery).
In contrast to the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, the
Bankruptcy Code explicitly sets forth the requirements for the
Absolute Priority Rule. There are three variants on the Absolute
Priority Rule depending on whether the objecting class, which is
being crammed down under the plan, consists of secured creditors,
unsecured creditors, or equity holders. This Article focuses on the
Absolute Priority Rule as applied to an objecting class of unsecured
creditors. However, it is worth noting that to cramdown a class of
secured creditors, the plan must provide for one of three scenarios
set forth in section 1129(b)(2)(A):
(i)(I) that [the secured creditors in the class (I)] retain the liens
securing such claims . . . to the extent of the allowed amount of
such claim; and (II) that each holder of a claim of such class
receive . . . deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of at least the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s
31
interest in such property;
30. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1122. For example, debtors can also allow creditors
of identical priority to be assigned to different classes even if those classes will receive
different treatment under the plan. Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 32-37.
Brunstad and Sigal observe that the case law is split on exactly how flexible the
classification rules are.
Generally they found that judges restrict separate
classification of creditors with parity by either the “nature of the claim,” “nature of
the claimant,” “business justification,” “general fairness,” “reasonableness,” or they
do not enforce any substantial restrictions. Id.
31. This provision requires that a crammed-down secured lien holder retain its
lien on the attached collateral up to the amount of the allowed secured claim (the
portion of the secured claim that is not allowed is considered unsecured because it is
not covered by the value of the collateral) and also receive present value of the
allowed claim through deferred cash payments. See generally Joel L. Tabas, The
§ 1111(b) Election: A Decision-making Framework, 23-1 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36 (2004)
(providing an analytical framework for determining whether making an election
under § 1111(b) would be in the unsecured creditor’s best interest); David G.

MILLER

6/28/2006 9:15:42 PM

2006] STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE

1357

(ii) for the sale . . . of any property that is subject to the liens
securing the [secured creditors’] claims, free and clear of such
liens, with the liens attaching to the proceeds of the sale, and the
treatment of the liens on the proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of
32
this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by [the secured creditors] of the
33
indubitable equivalent of such claims.

To cramdown a class of unsecured creditors, section
1129(b)(2)(B) requires that the plan must either (i) pay those
creditors in full (technically provide that all creditors in the class
receive “property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal
to the allowed amount of such claim”) or, as is more common,
(ii) “the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of
such junior claim or interest any property [from the debtor’s
34
estate].”

Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV.
435, 439-43 (1998) (discussing cramdown provisions of secured claims).
32. This provision is enforced if the collateral that is securing the allowed claim
of the secured creditor is sold under a plan. To protect the secured creditor, the
code requires that the secured creditor’s lien carries over to the proceeds of the sale
of the collateral and that this new lien remains protected by one of the other
provisions of § 1129(b)(2)(A). See Arnold & Baker Farms v. United States ex rel.
United States Farmers Home Admin. (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 85 F.3d 1415,
1420 (9th Cir. 1996).
33. Here a court can force a secured creditor to exchange its lien for its
indubitable equivalent. The hallmark of indubitable equivalency is not clearly
defined and courts have been allowed to determine as a matter of fact what exactly it
means. In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 172 (7th Cir. 1992).
34. “The [Absolute Priority Rule] has three components: (1) the identification
of junior claims or interests; (2) the identification of any property retained by the
holders of such claims or interests; and (3) the determination whether the property
is retained ‘on account of’ a junior claim or interest.” In re 4 C Solutions, Inc., 302
B.R. 592, 596 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003) (citing In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc., 72
F.3d 1305, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995)). Thus, a plan that proposed to provide the owners
of a farm in Chapter 11 with a continuing interest despite that an objecting class of
unsecured creditors was not paid in full violated the Absolute Priority Rule. Norwest
Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-03 (1988); see In re Drimmel, 135 B.R.
410, 412 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that the Absolute Priority Rule gives “unsecured
creditors [] an absolute priority over equity interests to receive money or property
until the unsecured creditors are paid in full”). In 4 C Solutions, the court held that
distribution of equity in the reorganized debtor under a plan of reorganization to
the majority shareholder of the debtor’s parent, where an impaired class of claims
rejected the plan, violated the Absolute Priority Rule. 302 B.R. at 600. “The
common thread running through cases involving the Absolute Priority Rule is a
refusal to allow prior equity owners to trade on their ‘insider’ status to acquire new
equity for less than its value.” Id. at 596 (citing In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc.,
72 F.3d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1995).
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C. Creative Strategies for Avoiding The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition
and Absolute Priority Rule
As applied to an objecting class of unsecured creditors, the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule appear
fairly straightforward. The plan cannot provide the objecting class of
creditors a distribution that is substantially different from other coequal classes (horizontal parity) and the plan cannot provide any
junior class of claims or interests below the objecting class (generally,
equity holders) any distribution (vertical justice). Notwithstanding
these seemingly straightforward requirements, innovative structures
have been created to soften the hard edges of the Absolute Priority
Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition to enable the
reorganization of the debtor.
1. The New Value Corollary
A plan will occasionally provide a distribution to some or all equity
holders (despite the existence of an objecting class of creditors) on
the grounds that the distribution is not being given to the
shareholder “on account of” the equity interest, but was given for
“new value” being contributed by the equity holder. The New Value
Corollary is also known as the “new value exception.” When a
shareholder obtains an interest in the reorganized entity as a result of
infusing new value, the interest is not truly “on account of” the old
35
shares. Rather, it is “on account of” the new value. As such, the
situation is not really an exception to the Absolute Priority Rule. The
new investment falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority
Rule.
The “New Value Corollary” was addressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust and Savings
36
Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership. In that case, despite
the arguments presented, the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue
of whether the New Value Corollary survived the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court did say that if the New Value
Corollary exists, the opportunity to receive a distribution on account
of new value must be subject to a market test (i.e., offered to others

35. What is prohibited by the Absolute Priority Rule is the receipt or retention
under the plan of any property by a junior stakeholder on account of its claim or
interest.
36. 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
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The New Value

2. The Gifting Strategy (Armstrong)
Another structure designed to achieve plan confirmation, and the
topic of this Article, has been to argue that the additional
consideration being distributed under the plan to one class of
unsecured creditors over another (in seeming violation of the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition) or the consideration being received by
equity when an objecting class of creditors is not being paid in full (in
seeming violation of the Absolute Priority Rule) is not property of the
debtor’s estate and is instead being provided or “gifted” or
“contributed” consensually by other creditors. Under the most
attenuated scenario, the distribution is deemed to be given by the
debtor to an accepting class of creditors and, by accepting the plan,
that class is deemed to waive that particular distribution in favor of
the junior class. Under this argument, the Absolute Priority Rule
does not apply to the distribution, because it is being given by nondebtors who have a “right” to do whatever they want with their plan
distribution, i.e., their property.
This is exactly what the debtor and its professionals attempted to
39
do in Armstrong. As described below, under the plan negotiated
among many disparate groups’ representatives, including the debtor,
the general unsecured creditors’ committee, the asbestos personal
injury claimants’ committee, and others, it was agreed that an equity
holder would receive a distribution of warrants in the reorganized
40
debtor.
However, to effectuate the agreement reached if the
general unsecured creditors rejected the plan, the plan provided that
in such case, the warrants would not be issued by the debtor to
41
equity. Instead, the warrants would be technically distributed by the
42
debtor to the class of asbestos personal injury claimants, which the
debtor knew would accept the plan. The plan further provided that
by accepting the plan, the class of asbestos personal injury claimants
would be deemed to have agreed to waive receipt of the warrants and
43
contribute them to the equity holder. Although the end result was
37. Id. at 457.
38. See infra Part II.A.9.
39. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir.
2005).
40. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 525-26 (D.
Del. 2005).
41. 432 F.3d at 509.
42. Id.
43. 320 B.R. at 526 & n.8.
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the same as if the debtor had provided the warrants directly to the
equity holder, because the plan structure provided for the
distribution of the warrants to a class of creditors equal in priority to
the objecting general unsecured creditors, with that class
contributing the warrants to the equity holder, the debtor believed
that the Absolute Priority Rule did not apply.
While the plan in Armstrong might appear extreme to an observer
inexperienced with the evolution of the Bankruptcy Code since 1978,
the Armstrong plan was merely the next step in a series of singularly
minor but cumulatively major steps since the First Circuit Court of
Appeals issued its influential decision in Official, Unsecured Creditors’
44
Committee v. Stern (In re SPM Manufacturing Corp.).
SPM did not
involve the Absolute Priority Rule. In SPM, the secured creditor in a
Chapter 7 case agreed to give a portion of the proceeds received
from the liquidation of its collateral security to general unsecured
creditors in exchange for such creditors’ agreement to an orderly
45
non-litigious liquidation of the debtor’s estate. The First Circuit
condoned this agreement, over the objection of a taxing authority,
which would have had Bankruptcy Code priority over the general
unsecured creditors as to any distribution of proceeds from the
46
debtor’s unencumbered property.
In oft-quoted language, the
court noted “creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish
with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them
47
with other creditors.”
Subsequently, many courts relied on this quote from SPM to hold
that various gifting arrangements were appropriate notwithstanding
48
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition or the Absolute Priority Rule.
With a few exceptions, courts have generally accepted the extensions
of SPM—from the Chapter 7 context (where the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition and the Absolute Priority Rule do not
apply) to Chapter 11 plans (where they do apply), from gifting by
secured creditors (whose interest in the collateral is undisputed) to
gifting through other unsecured creditors (who receive the
distribution only because the debtors agreed to provide it to them),
and so on. Courts have generally only refused to apply SPM upon
finding inappropriate attempts to circumvent protective provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, the debtor in Armstrong went just
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1313.
Id.
See infra Part III.
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a step further in proposing a plan providing for alternate distribution
schemes for the warrants to get to the equity holder via the “gifting”
mechanism only if the class of general unsecured creditors rejected
the plan.
Faced with what it believed was brazen flouting of the Absolute
Priority Rule (to get to an impermissible end), the District Court for
the District of Delaware, in Armstrong I, rejected the
recommendations of the Bankruptcy Court and denied confirmation
49
50
of the plan.
The Third Circuit concurred.
According to the
district court, the concept of gifting had gone too far. That court
held that while SPM may have been appropriate in its limited factual
circumstances, the extensions of SPM leading up to Armstrong
51
generally were not.
In the court’s view, both the language and
legislative history of the Absolute Priority Rule were clear that equity
52
was to get no distribution on account of its equity interests—period.
In a fairly short opinion, the Third Circuit adopted the reasoning of
53
the district court; clever plan drafting and skillful creative
negotiation by the bankruptcy professionals be damned. From the
district court’s perspective the plain meaning of the code provisions
could not be disregarded on the basis that reorganization is the
primary objective of Chapter 11.
The Armstrong decision marks a triumph of form over substance
and may chill creative solutions to complex multi-party negotiations.
The result of this decision is that Chapter 11 plan negotiations may
be more difficult, leading to longer periods spent in Chapter 11 by
debtors (contrary to the goals of Chapter 11) and more contentious
54
confirmation battles.

49. See Armstrong I, 320 B.R. at 540 (“Bluntly put, no amount of legal creativity or
counsel’s incantation to general notions of equity or to any supposed policy favoring
reorganizations over liquidation supports judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, the New Warrants distribution to the Equity Interest Holders under the
Fourth Amended Reorganization Plan violates 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The
Plan, therefore, cannot be confirmed.”).
50. See Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514 (rejecting the idea that there are no limits on
what creditors may do with the bankruptcy proceeds they receive).
51. Armstrong I, 320 B.R. at 539-40.
52. Id. at 536.
53. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 514.
54. Even the Third Circuit recognized that, although it was affirming the
decision to deny plan confirmation, “the longer that the reorganization process
takes, the less likely that the purposes of Chapter 11 (preserving the business as a
going concern and maximizing the amount that can be paid to creditors) will be
fulfilled.” Id. at 518. While this statement is not always true (i.e., sometimes quick
fixes minimize value), it is generally true. Moreover, it is always a shame for a
company to linger in Chapter 11 incurring professionals fees and unable to move on
simply due to a technicality that one group is relying on for hold up value.
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II. HISTORY OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE AND UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITION
To evaluate the merits of Armstrong, one must examine the roots
and policy behind the Absolute Priority Rule and the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition.
A. The Absolute Priority Rule
1. Equity receiverships
The history of the Absolute Priority Rule takes us back to the
nineteenth century when the economic distress of the railroads was
55
pervasive. As the railroad industry grew, from the Civil War through
World War II, railroads were organized with highly leveraged,
56
unworkable capital structures. As a result of an inability to generate
sufficient operating revenue to service its debt, due in part to
cutthroat competition, the railroad industry in the United States
57
began to suffer widespread decline and insolvency. By 1915, almost
half of all railroads had defaulted on their debt obligations at one
58
time or another and required some sort of financial restructuring.
In light of the size and importance of railroads and the interstate
dimension of their operations, federal courts responded to the crisis
by creating a form of reorganization known as the equity
59
receivership. The judicially created equity receivership is analogous
60
to modern-day Chapter 11. The equity receivership was a friendly,
55. See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963,
969-70 (1989) (recapitulating the early history of the absolute priority rule).
56. See Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1420, 1433-35 (2004) (noting that the decline of the railroad
industry was made worse by three trends: decline in availability of foreign
investment, an increased reliance on debt financing, and an increased use of internal
funding); Ayer, supra note 55, at 970.
57. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1428-29 (attributing the decline in railroads to
low net revenues that resulted from cutthroat competition in the form of extreme
rate cuts and “continued financial rot,” by which the author appears to imply corrupt
management); Ayer, supra note 55, at 970.
58. See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L. REV. 69, 74 (1991) (explaining that the ineffectiveness of
foreclosure as a remedy for defaulted loans gave rise to the alternate remedy of
reorganization).
59. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441; DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION, 5657 (Peter Dougherty ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2004) (2001) (explaining that courts
created the equity receivership by combining two common-law principles: the
court’s power to appoint receivers to preserve the value of a debtor’s property and
the mortgage holder’s right to foreclose on property when the debtor defaults); see
also Markell, supra note 58, at 74-75 (asserting that the receivership also emerged out
of necessity—it was necessary to reorganize the business as a going concern because
no one could afford to buy the railroad assets in a typical disclosure proceeding).
60. See SKEEL, supra note 59, at 58 (noting that appointing a receiver served
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cooperative process commenced by a creditor filing a petition (a
“creditor’s bill”) in federal court asking the court to exercise its
equity jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to administer the insolvent
61
debtor’s assets. The company, which was required to file an answer,
generally admitted to the allegations in the petition and consented to
62
the appointment of the receiver. The court would then grant the
63
petition and appoint a receiver.
Consistent with the appointment of the receiver, the federal court
would issue an injunction staying actions against the railroad and its
64
property.
The receiver would operate and manage the railroad
until the various stakeholders, who usually formed themselves into
protective committees, negotiated a plan of reorganization with the
65
assistance of a reorganization manager. The plan would provide for
the sale of the railroad property with an upset price to a new
66
company that would continue to operate the railroad. Usually the
secured creditors would end up owning the new railroad company
67
and some proceeds of the sale would be distributed under the plan.
Often, the former owners of the railroad would retain an equity
interest in the reorganized company despite the failure to satisfy
68
creditors in whole. This happened for several reasons. Sometimes,
the secured creditors agreed to buy off the equity to avoid frivolous

largely the same purpose as an automatic stay issued in a Chapter 11 proceeding, in
that most creditors had to cease their collection attempts). But see Lubben, supra
note 56, at 1424-25 (stating that the equity receiverships were more like workouts
than Chapter 11, as they were limited to modest adjustments to the company’s
capital structure).
61. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441-42 (clarifying
that the petition had to be filed by an unsecured creditor to ensure that the receiver
obtained control over all of the debtor’s assets, not just those subject to the secured
creditor’s liens). State court receiverships did exist and were common, but large
creditors preferred federal jurisdiction, which they would obtain through diversity
jurisdiction. See id. at 1442.
62. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1442.
63. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1442 (noting that courts sometimes appointed
multiple receivers). Thus, although the court often appointed an officer or other
insider of the company to be the receiver, it would generally also appoint an
independent co-receiver to guard against self-dealing. See id.
64. See SKEEL, supra note 59, at 58 (remarking that freezing most of the railroad’s
debt obligations gave the parties “breathing space” to design a reorganization plan).
65. See id. (noting that the committees could take months, or even years, to
negotiate a reorganization plan).
66. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444 (pointing out that in most of these sales,
the new company was comprised of the reorganization committee).
67. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445; Markell, supra
note 58, at 75-76.
68. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445 (describing how the former shareholders
would pay a cash assessment that provided much needed liquidity to the reorganized
railroad in exchange for stock in the new entity).
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69

and time-consuming objections to their scheme. Other times, either
the old equity holders were the best source of cash that was needed
for the reorganization, or the secured creditors believed the old
70
owners were necessary to manage the reorganized enterprise. In yet
other cases, the debtor was controlled by management insiders who
71
owned both bonds and stock.
All of these situations involved collusion between the debtor and
the secured creditors. At first, the secured creditor would initiate the
judicial proceeding, and the debtor would consent to the
72
appointment of a receiver.
Later the fiction of a controverted
proceeding was dispensed with and the debtor commenced with
73
Generally, the appointed
equity receivership by direct petition.
receiver would sell the railroad company assets to a “new” entity for
less than the amount needed to cover the secured debt, and
74
sometimes less than the actual value of the assets. Importantly, the
investors in the new entity were generally the stockholders and
75
secured bondholders of the old company.
The secured
76
bondholders could “credit bid” the face amount of their securities.
For a contribution (or “assessment”) in the new entity, the old equity
would end up retaining an interest in the assets worth much more
77
than the size of the contribution.
69. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 971.
70. See Markell, supra note 58, at 75-76 (explaining that because the old equity
holders were often also managers of the railroad, they had knowledge of how to run
the entity and they were also willing to invest new cash to save their former
investment).
71. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 971 (noting that it did not matter to these insidermanagers if they lost on bonds, but gained on stock). Lubben describes the railroad
industry of the era as extremely corrupt. “Most of the great [railroads] had been
built by fraudulent construction companies, and if perchance a [rail]road had been
honestly built, there was always an opportunity to correct this oversight by
disreputable, but highly profitable, manipulation of its securities.” Lubben, supra
note 56, at 1427 (quoting E. G. CAMPBELL, THE REORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN
RAILROAD SYSTEM 1893-1900 15 (1938)). He cites several examples, including the use
of management-owned companies to do the construction and accounting fraud. Id.
72. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970.
73. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1441 n.106 (citing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Cent. Trust Co., 22 F. 272, 272-75 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1884) as the first case in
which the debtor initiated its own receivership).
74. Ayer, supra note 55, at 970.
75. Id.; Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445.
76. See, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 683
(1899) (acknowledging the general rule that secured creditors were the most likely
purchasers in a foreclosure sale because of the high cost of railroads); see also
Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444-45 (recognizing that collusion among bankers may
have also prevented outside purchasers from obtaining financing to purchase the
assets).
77. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970-71 (explaining that while the insider
bondholders lose on their secured bond claims by permitting equity to participate,
they would benefit on their equity interests, all at the expense of non-insider
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The old secured creditors would receive securities in the new
78
Sometimes only a subset of the old secured creditors
company.
would participate in the reorganized entity, with the other
79
bondholders getting paid in cash from the sale of the assets. As
explained below, until the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was
developed, it was possible to treat some secured creditors differently
from others, and Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was developed to
80
prevent such outcomes.
Most of the time, however, all secured creditors had an incentive to
81
participate in the sale or otherwise receive a lesser recovery.
Specifically, the court would set an “upset price,” which was the
82
minimum price for which the railroad’s assets could be sold.
Claimants were provided an opportunity to either participate in the
83
sale or receive a cash distribution at the upset price. The upset
price was set intentionally low to encourage creditors to agree to the
84
plan. Thus, old secured creditors would accept the distribution that
provided potentially less than their full secured debt, but with an
opportunity to realize higher returns from future operations. The
85
alternative of non-acceptance was a low cash payout. Because the
assets were sold for less than the secured debt, unsecured creditors
86
were squeezed out and generally received nothing.
bondholders and trade creditors); Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (describing how the
foreclosure sale made the railroad’s assets unreachable by unsecured creditors).
Lubben states that the assessment paid by stockholders, though smaller than the
value of the stock, was actually high enough to exclude smaller stakeholders, such as
unsecured creditors and minority stockholders, who could not afford the assessment.
See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1446.
78. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1445 (noting that existing shareholders would
receive preferred stock in the new corporation or subordinated notes in exchange
for paying an assessment).
79. See Markell, supra note 7, at 230 (explaining that the minority groups of
secured creditors often opted for cash proceeds from the sale rather than
participation in the new entity).
80. See infra notes 207-44.
81. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970 (emphasizing that the price of the new entity
was consistently less than the entity’s actual worth); Lubben, supra note 56, at 1450
(likening the upset price to an auction reserve).
82. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1450 (noting that the court set the upset price,
in part to prevent parties from conspiring to pay a price that would defeat the just
claims of other secured creditors).
83. Id.
84. See id. (suggesting that the upset price began as a tool to protect minority
creditors, but evolved into a tool to force reluctant creditors to agree to the plan).
85. See id. (remarking that most bondholders realized that the securities were
worth more than the cash proceeds from the sale).
86. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 970 (concluding that unsecured creditors were
“eliminated” from the transaction); Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (explaining that the
mortgagor had first priority over the old railroad entity’s assets, leaving nothing for
remaining creditors). Although without statutory authority, there was no formal
discharge of the unsecured debt, the effect was the same as a discharge, as the
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In general, the equity receiverships were not wholly successful.
Just as the secured creditors were often compelled to provide the old
owners with more than they were arguably entitled to, the
negotiation usually resulted in the reorganized company taking on a
88
debt burden larger than it could handle.
Consequently, many
railroad companies that ended up in equity receiverships availed
89
themselves of the process multiple times.
2. Boyd and the development of the “fixed principle”
While the collusion between the old owners and the secured
creditors led each side to extract as much value as possible from the
assets, often at the expense of the health of the company, one
commonality that existed in the equity receiverships was the
90
elimination of any recovery for the unsecured creditors.
The
apparent wrongfulness of equity retaining an interest in the
reorganized railroad while unsecured creditors received nothing lead
to the establishment of the Absolute Priority Rule, then called the
91
“fixed principle.”
Although courts adjudicating railroad cases had long recognized
the concept that an equity holder’s interest in property of a debtor’s
unsecured creditors were left to pursue their claims against a shell company with no
assets (the former railroad). See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1444-45.
87. Lubben, supra note 56, at 1423.
88. Id.
89. See id. Lubben found that,
having undergone a receivership before World War I made a railroad more
than two-and-a-half times (or 150%) more likely to undergo another
receivership or bankruptcy after the War. The average railroad that
organized under a receivership subsequently failed at a rate more than twice
as high as railroads that had never gone through a receivership and almost
three times as high as modern Chapter 11 debtors.
Id. According to Lubben, the receivership acted as a safe harbor of sorts for railroads
during economic downturns. Id. at 1451. When a downturn occurred, the railroad
would consent to the receivership. Id. It would remain in operation during the
downturn and emerge from receivership when the economy improved without the
needed debt reductions, as those would be opposed by the secured bondholders. Id.
at 1451-52.
90. See Markell, supra note 58, at 76 (describing how bondholders and
stockholders would collude to protect their interests during the foreclosure sale and
the implementation of the reorganization plan, without considering the interests of
unsecured creditors).
91. See In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1314 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In
its origins, the absolute priority rule was a judicial invention designed to preclude the
practice in railroad reorganizations of ‘squeezing out’ intermediate unsecured
creditors through collusion between secured creditors and stockholders (who were
often the same people).”) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 482 (1913)).
Markell notes that the first attacks by unsecured creditors on the receiver scheme
started as fraudulent conveyance arguments, the idea being that shareholders and
secured creditors were scheming to transfer assets with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors. Markell, supra note 58, at 76-77.
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92

estate is subordinate to the rights of creditors, the United States
Supreme Court officially embraced that “fixed principle” in Northern
93
Pacific Railway v. Boyd, a 5-4 decision. In Boyd, representatives of the
secured creditors (bondholders) and representatives of the
stockholders agreed to a plan of reorganization, which was approved
94
by the equity receivership court. In accordance with the plan, the
parties transferred property of the old railroad company (the
insolvent Northern Pacific Railroad Company) to a new company (the
95
newly created Northern Pacific Railway Company).
Despite an
agreement between the secured creditors and stockholders that the
property being transferred had a value of $345,000,000, the price
paid for the property was $61,500,000, which was $86,000,000 less
96
than the amount of the secured debts on the company. The old
secured bondholders received bonds in the new company and the old
equity holders received an equity interest in the Northern Pacific
97
Railway Company.
Interestingly, the new railroad company was
profitable, and the price of the equity securities rose after the
98
reorganization.
After the sale, a general unsecured creditor of the old company
commenced an action against the new company seeking payment on
99
his claim against the old company. He argued that the sale was void
because it was made in pursuance of an illegal plan of reorganization
between secured bondholders and stockholders under which
unsecured creditors were not paid but stockholders received value by
100
receiving shares in the new company.
The United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the creditor,
allowing him to pursue his claim against the new company in light of
101
its ownership by the old equity holders.
The Court held that the
equity holders and bondholders should not have been able to
accomplish in a court proceeding what they could not have
102
accomplished in a private sale. The Court noted that “a transfer by
92. See Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry. Co., 174 U.S. 674, 684
(1899) (“[A]ny arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and
interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior
rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.”).
93. 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
94. Id. at 489.
95. Id. at 501.
96. Id. at 489-90.
97. Id. at 488.
98. Id. at 491.
99. Id. at 501.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 501-02.
102. Id. at 502.
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stockholders from themselves to themselves [in a private sale] cannot
defeat the claim of a non-assenting creditor. As against him the sale
103
is void in equity, regardless of the motive with which it was made.”
And, “[t]here is no difference in principle if the contract of
reorganization, instead of being effectuated by private sale, is
104
consummated by a master’s deed under a consent decree.”
Further, “[a]ny device, whether by private contract or judicial sale
under consent decree, whereby stockholders were preferred before
105
the creditor was invalid.”
Accordingly, the new company (in the
hands of the old stockholders) was subject to the existing liabilities of
106
the old company. Thus, even though the court found there was no
fraud and that this was a contractual arrangement between the
bondholders and the shareholders, the transfer of assets to the new
Northern Pacific Railway Company with old ownership interests
becoming the new equity holders subjected the new company to the
107
unsecured debts of the old company.
Interestingly, the plan proponents made an Armstrong-gifting-type
108
argument that was rejected by the Court. They argued that because
the property was sold for less than the value of the mortgage debt,
there would have been nothing left for unsecured creditors even if
109
equity had not received a distribution. Although it does not appear
that it was argued explicitly that the secured creditors contributed or
gifted their distribution to equity, this could have been implied.
The Court rejected this argument, noting that such an agreement
with equity negatively alters the incentives that equity would
otherwise have had to side with the general unsecured creditors in
asserting a high value for the property:
In saying that there was nothing for unsecured creditors the
argument assumes the very fact which the law contemplated was to
be tested by adversary proceeding in which it would have been to
the interest of the stockholders to interpose every valid defense. If,
after a trial, a sale was ordered, they were still interested in making
the property bring its value, so as to leave a surplus for themselves
as ultimate owners. Even after sale they could have opposed its
confirmation if the bids had been chilled, or other reason existed
to prevent is approval. In the present case all these tests and

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id.
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safeguards were withdrawn. The stockholders, who, in lawfully
protecting themselves, would necessarily have protected unsecured
creditors, abandoned the defense that the foreclosure suit had
been prematurely brought. The law, of course, did not require
them to make or insist upon that defense if it was not meritorious,
nor does it condemn the decree solely because it was entered by
consent. But the shareholders were not merely quiescent. They,
though in effect defendants, became parties to a contract with the
creditors, who were in effect complainants, by which, in
consideration of stock in the new company, they transferred their
shares in the railroad to the railway. The latter then owning the
bonds of the complainant and controlling the stock in the
defendant, became the representative of both parties in interest.
In such a situation there was nothing to litigate, and so the
110
demurrer to the bill was withdrawn.

For this reason, the Court held the value of the assets did not
matter—rather it announced a “fixed principle” that equity was never
111
to be paid when creditors were not paid in full.
If equity
participated when creditors were not paid in full, a presumption of
112
However, foreshadowing the future Court’s
collusion arose.
interpretation of the “New Value Corollary,” which is discussed below
in more detail, the Boyd Court suggested that by offering the right to
participate to all creditors, the plan proponents could defeat the
113
presumption of collusion.
3. Innovative structures to avoid Boyd
Even though, in prior cases, the Court had articulated the general
concept that equity holders could not be paid if creditors were not
paid in full, the Boyd decision solidified the Absolute Priority Rule as
114
Although the Boyd case sent
a force in reorganization practice.
110. Id. at 505-06.
111. Id. at 507. The Court wrote,
The invalidity of the sale flowed from the character of the reorganization
agreement regardless of the value of the property, for in cases like this, the
question must be decided according to a fixed principle, not leaving the
rights of the creditors to depend upon the balancing of evidence as to
whether, on the day of the sale, the property was insufficient to pay prior
encumbrances.
Id.
112. Id.; see Markell, supra note 58, at 81 (noting that the presumption of collusion
was sufficient to create liability of the new entity).
113. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508; see also Markell, supra note 58, at 81 (characterizing this
method to defeat the presumption of collusion as a procedural tool to avoid judicial
involvement in evaluating the worth of the entity).
114. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 973 (arguing that, although the Absolute Priority
Rule had been recognized by the Court in other cases, the facts of Boyd, particularly
that the creditor who brought the suit had very unsympathetic facts, demonstrated
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“chills of terror down the spines of the corporate reorganization
115
bar,” clever reorganization professionals developed structures to
116
Among those practices were obtaining court
avoid its full effect.
117
approval of the deal to bar later objections.
Others were able to
convince courts that obtaining acceptance by a substantial majority of
senior creditors demonstrated the fairness of the plan and were able
118
to engineer the process to prevent dissent.
Certain scholars
developed a theory of “relative priority,” as opposed to “absolute
119
Other practitioners began asserting something akin to
priority.”
120
the New Value Corollary.
In some of those cases, as suggested by
Boyd, unsecured creditors were given the same option to participate
as equity holders. However in general, the unsecured creditors could
not afford the contribution price that sophisticated equity holders
121
were able to pay.
4.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not initially apply to large
122
corporations and explicitly excepted railroads from its provisions.
It was not until the 1930s that Congress enacted a federal
reorganization statute for large corporations as a reaction to the
123
Great Depression that started in 1929.
In 1933, Congress enacted
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act for railroads and in 1934 Congress
enacted section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act to apply the corporate

that “the Supreme Court [was] more insistent on the principle than it had been
before”).
115. Id. at 972.
116. See id. at 973 (remarking that the firmly established practice of reorganization
lawyers were destined to overcome the Court’s decree in Boyd); see also Markell, supra
note 58, at 81 (noting that reorganizations involving the participation of equity
owners remained prevalent even after Boyd).
117. Ayer, supra note 55, at 973.
118. See id. (indicating that managers used upset sales to quell dissent).
119. See id. (characterizing the relative priority theory as similar to the “share
scheme” that existed before Boyd); see also Markell, supra note 58, at 82 (“[The theory
of relative priority] did not require allocating participation rights according to the
full amount of prereceivership claims. Instead, it adjusted capital structure on the
basis of entitlement to future income, assuming no acceleration of senior debt.
Equity holders could participate only if the projected earnings of the reorganized
company exceeded pre-receivership debt service. Under the relative priority theory,
therefore, shareholders who contributed new value through paid assessments could
salvage at least some of their original investment.”).
120. Ayer, supra note 55, at 973.
121. See Markell, supra note 58, at 81-82 (explaining that the creditors’ purchase of
the new entities’ securities provided much needed capital for the railroads).
122. See Lubben, supra note 56, at 1440 (noting that the 1867 Bankruptcy Act,
repealed in 1878, did not exclude railroads, and that some railroads filed under that
Act).
123. Id.
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124

reorganization provisions to other corporations.
These sections
provided “the judge shall confirm the plan if satisfied that . . . it is fair
and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of
125
creditors or stockholders and is feasible.”
The Bankruptcy Act
contained no clarification on what Congress meant by “fair and
equitable.”
5. Case and the Absolute Priority Rule
126
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that the phrase “fair and equitable” in section
77B of the Bankruptcy Act was meant to codify the “fixed principle”
(or Absolute Priority Rule) set forth in equity receivership cases like
127
Louisville Trust and Boyd.
The Court noted that those cases
established the “precedence to be accorded creditors over
128
stockholders in reorganization plans.” Thus, determining whether
a plan was “fair and equitable” was not merely a factor for the Court
to consider, rather, it was a test wholly separate from any voting
129
requirements; a “rule of full or absolute priority.”
Consequently, in Case, where stockholders received consideration
under the plan before bondholders were paid in full, a unanimous
Court held that the plan was improperly confirmed, notwithstanding
that the bondholder who objected held merely $18,500 in face
amount of bonds and that over ninety-two percent of all bondholders
130
consented to the plan.
Effectively, the Case decision meant that
absent the consent of one-hundred percent of creditors, a
reorganization could not be achieved at all if the Absolute Priority
Rule was violated, regardless of meeting the consent requirements of
the Bankruptcy Act.
6. The Chandler Act
The Chandler Act of 1938 repealed the general corporate
reorganization section of the Bankruptcy Act (section 77B) and
124. Id.
125. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 77B(f)(1), Pub. L. No. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 919
(repealed 1938) (emphasis added).
126. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
127. Id. at 114-19 (holding that the “fixed principle,” enumerated in Boyd, was
“firmly imbedded” in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). Although the Bankruptcy Act was
amended via the Chandler Act in 1938, see infra note 175, Case was decided under
the pre-Chandler Act Bankruptcy Act, i.e., section 77B. In any case, the Court noted
that the “fair and equitable” criterion remained unchanged by the Chandler Act.
Case, 308 U.S. at 119 n.14.
128. Id. at 115-16.
129. Id. at 117.
130. Id. at 111-14.
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created three different chapters of reorganization: Chapter 10 for
public companies, Chapter 11 for smaller compositions, and Chapter
131
The “fair and equitable”
12 for real estate partnerships.
132
requirement applied to all three chapters.
7. Further Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
While the Absolute Priority Rule adopted in Case (where equity
could in no circumstances receive a distribution if creditors were not
paid in full) was practical in the case of a typical large public Chapter
10 debtor, it proved unworkable in the case of a typical Chapter 11
debtor—a distressed sole proprietorship or closely held
133
corporation. In such cases, where management was often the sole
equity holder of a “family corporation” and the creditors were its
entity’s vendors, both parties had an interest in the existing
134
management continuing to run the company. As a result, creditors
generally were willing to accept less even though equity retained its
135
interest. The Absolute Priority Rule, by prohibiting the old owners
from retaining an equity interest, prevented the reorganization that
all parties appeared to want in the Chapter 11 case. Consequently,
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in 1952 to remove “fair and
equitable” (the Absolute Priority Rule) from the requirements for
136
but retained the
plan confirmation for Chapter 11 debtors,
137
requirement for Chapter 10 cases.
8. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code
138
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code. The drafters of
the Bankruptcy Code had many choices regarding what type of
Absolute Priority Rule to enact. For example, they had to decide
139
between (1) the expansive Absolute Priority Rule adopted in Case,
which would apply on a creditor-by-creditor basis even if all classes
131. See Markell, supra note 7, at 232 (noting that section 77, which had applied to
railroads, was not changed by the Chandler Act).
132. Id.
133. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 977 (explaining that this was workable public policy
in large corporations, “where equity ownership might come and go”).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579, § 35, 66 Stat. 420, 433 (1952) (repealed 1978).
137. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
1960, 1982 (1952), which noted that if the Bankruptcy Act was not amended in that
way, “no individual debtor and, under Chapter 11, no corporate debtor where the
stock ownership is substantially identical with management could effectuate an
arrangement except by payment of the claim of all creditors in full”).
138. See generally Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (reviewing Congress’s enactment of
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978).
139. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 106 (1939).
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consented or (2) a narrower Absolute Priority Rule that would apply
140
only if there was an objecting class. Congress chose the latter.
They also had to decide whether to adopt a strong Absolute Priority
Rule with no stated exceptions or a weaker Absolute Priority Rule
with enumerated exceptions. In this case, Congress chose the
141
former.
142
House Document 137 (“1973 Report”), outlining the proposed
statute of the National Bankruptcy Commission and serving as a basis
for the Bankruptcy Code, actually included a much weakened
143
Absolute Priority Rule.
The 1973 Report proposed an Absolute
Priority Rule that would have given courts broad powers to provide a
distribution to old equity holders under various scenarios even when
144
creditors were not paid in full.
For example, it would have
permitted a recovery to equity holders based on their contribution of
“continued management . . . essential to the business” or other
145
contributions beyond “money or money’s worth.”
It also would
146
have enabled the court to manipulate valuation, and it would have
given old equity owners a chance to participate in the upside of the
reorganized company for up to five years in the future (an option or
147
warrant of sorts).
This proposal was heavily criticized, leading
148
Congress to reject it when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code.
140. See infra pp. 1362 (analyzing the Bankruptcy Code’s Absolute Priority Rule).
141. See infra Part II.A.9 (discussing the New Corollary Rule and its impact on the
1978 Bankruptcy Code’s Absolute Priority Rule).
142. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON THE
BANKR. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973) (recommending a
proposed bill and containing related Commission studies).
143. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (explaining how the 1973 Report contained an
insubstantial Absolute Priority Rule).
144. Id.
145. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 258.
146. The 1973 Report specifically proposed that courts find that
there is a reasonable basis for the valuation on which the plan is based and the
plan is fair and equitable in that there is a reasonable probability that the
securities issued and other consideration distributed under the plan will fully
compensate the respective classes of creditors and equity security holders of
the debtor for their respective interests in the debtor or his property.
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, LEG. HISTORY OF THE BANKR. REFORM ACT OF 1978 pt. 827
(King 15th rev. ed. 1996) (emphasis added) (discussing proposed section 7310(d)(2)(B)). The 1973 Report explains that “the court is allowed more leeway in
arriving at an informed estimate of valuation in recognition of the difficulty of
predicting future earnings and arriving at an appropriate capitalization rate, by the
use of the phrases ‘reasonable basis for valuation’ and ‘reasonable probability’ of
fully compensating prior claims and interests.” Id. at App. Pt. 4-829.
147. See Ayer, supra note 55, at 978 (suggesting that the Absolute Priority Rule
proposed in the 1973 Report would have given equity owners “in effect, a sort of
option or warrant” in the debtor’s fortunes if they improved within five years of the
confirmation).
148. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 205-06 & n.5 (1988)
(describing sources of criticism); Ayer, supra note 55, at 979 (stating that Congress
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Instead, a modified version of the Absolute Priority Rule was codified
149
by Congress in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code is a middle
ground between the extremely loose standards proposed in the 1973
Report and the rigid rule announced in Case. Specifically, unlike in
150
Case, where a plan that provided a distribution to equity owners
could not be confirmed despite its overwhelming general acceptance
151
by all parties, the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code
only applies in “cramdown” where an entire class objects to the
152
plan.
It explicitly does not apply if all classes vote to accept the
plan.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not give an individual creditor
the right to challenge a distribution to equity if its class accepted the
plan, it does protect the individual creditor from the tyranny of a
majority that might agree to give away too much. Specifically,
Congress adopted the “Best Interests Test” to ensure that a court
could not confirm the plan over the objection of a creditor if that
creditor did not receive at least as much under the plan as it would in
153
a liquidation.
Essentially, the Bankruptcy Code establishes a two-tier entitlement
154
First, the proceeds, up to the liquidation value of the
system.
debtor, are distributed in strict conformance with the priority
155
scheme.
Any creditor can defeat a plan that does not provide it
156
Second, proceeds in excess of
with its entitled liquidation share.
abandoned the Absolute Priority Rule proposed in the 1973 Report when it enacted
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 because many legal scholars criticized the Absolute
Priority Rule in law review articles).
149. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000) (“[T]he holder of any claim or
interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the
plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property . . . .”).
150. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
151. See id. at 114 (“At the outset it should be stated that where a plan is not fair
and equitable as a matter of law it cannot be approved by the court even though the
percentage of the various classes of security holders required by section 77B, sub. f
for confirmation of the plan has consented.”).
152. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (instructing the court to confirm a plan upon the
request of a proponent of the plan if the plan “does not discriminate unfairly, and is
fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired
under, and has not accepted, the plan”).
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (“[a court can only confirm a plan if w]ith
respect to each impaired class of claims or interests . . . each holder of a claim or
interest of such class (i) has accepted the plan; or (ii) will receive or retain under the
plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective date
of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or
retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on such date.”).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (providing requirements for reorganization plans).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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the liquidation value are negotiated among the debtor, creditors, and
often equity holders, and these proceeds are determined by requisite
157
majority votes of the classes.
Congress viewed Chapter 11 reorganization as a composition, or
158
agreement among all stakeholders. As such, the Bankruptcy Code
encourages the negotiation of a mutually beneficial plan of
reorganization and retains flexibility for various potential outcomes
depending on the circumstances of the case. In some cases, for
example, creditors may find it beneficial to provide a distribution to
the old equity holders to avoid a valuation fight or encourage the old
equity holders to stay and manage the reorganized debtor, a primary
159
objective being a consensual plan.
One commentator described the incentive system created by the
Bankruptcy Code:
The debtor [who is given the exclusive right to propose a plan and
solicit acceptances thereon for a period at the outset of the cases]
must make an offer attractive enough to avoid rejection by a
creditor class which, if it occurred, would be followed either by the
absolute priority required in a cramdown or by a liquidation. On
the other side, the creditors risk liquidation and consequent loss of
any share of a going concern surplus if they fail to come to terms.
The theory is that the parties will bargain for a composition result
which divides the going concern surplus to their mutual
160
advantage.

Similarly, another commentator described the tension underlying
the Absolute Priority Rule and the ambiguity surrounding its
application. He argues that, in theory, the application of the
Absolute Priority Rule should be a simple concept: if a debtor
157. See Markell, supra note 58, at 88 (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
changed the Absolute Priority Rule by allowing the remaining value of the debtor to
be allocated by votes within and among different classes once the creditor received
its liquidation value).
158. See John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy
History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 189 (1996) (tracing the history of bankruptcy laws,
primarily as they relate to the concept of discharge). McCoid’s central premise is
that bankruptcy has evolved from a simple creditor collection remedy (that differed
from other creditor collection remedies only in its encouragement of ratable
distribution) into a “statutorily mandated composition,” which is “an exchange of the
collection and distribution of assets to the creditors in which the debtor cooperated
in return for a release from further obligation on prebankruptcy debts.” Id. at 16465. McCoid argues that in determining what the terms of a bankruptcy should be,
one must “[view] bankruptcy as a form of composition rather than as a collective
collection device.” Id. at 165.
159. See id. at 189-90 (stating that the theory behind the Bankruptcy Code is that
parties will negotiate a plan which will fairly allocate the going concern surplus value
of the debtor to all of the parties).
160. Id. at 190.
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company is insolvent, its owners (i.e., the equity) cannot receive a
161
If the company is solvent and can pay all of its
distribution.
162
creditors in full, then the owners take what is left over. He points to
where this “simple dichotomy” unravels: if the value of the business is
worth more under the management of the current owners or if there
is uncertainty (or at least arguable uncertainty) that the owners may
163
exploit to obtain concessions.
Under one of those scenarios, or if
the new owners are willing to pay new value to obtain a stake in the
reorganized company, then it may be appropriate for the equity
holders to receive consideration even though all creditors may not be
164
paid in full.
9. The development of the New Value Corollary
The “New Value Corollary” is another method by which creative
restructuring professionals have been able to avoid a rigid application
of the Absolute Priority Rule. The professionals argue that old equity
holders should be allowed to retain an interest in the reorganized
company, not “on account of” their old equity interests (as this is
expressly prohibited by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)), but as a result of new
value being contributed by the equity holders. Understanding this
New Value Corollary is a prerequisite to analysis of the gifting
doctrine.
The principal United States Supreme Court cases that have
discussed the Absolute Priority Rule after the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code have done so in connection with the New Value
165
Corollary. Like the gifting doctrine, the New Value Corollary is not
in the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, courts have generally accepted
its validity. This is because they find that if the conditions for the
New Value Corollary are satisfied, the distribution to the junior
stakeholder falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority Rule.
As such, the New Value Corollary illustrates that the gifting scenario

161. See Markell, supra note 58, at 70 (addressing different views on the status and
application of the current Absolute Priority Rule).
162. See id. (discussing the basic premise that creditors’ interests take priority over
equity holders’ interests).
163. Id.
164. See id. (explaining ways that owners may continue their participation in the
reorganized entity).
165. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. La Salle St. P’ship, 526
U.S. 434, 448-49 (1999) (finding that legislative history does not bar the New Value
Corollary exception to the Absolute Priority Rule found in the Bankruptcy Code);
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (finding that the New
Value Corollary exception should not be expanded beyond the Court’s decisions at
the time Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978).
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also falls outside of the scope of the Absolute Priority Rule and
should likewise be accepted.
The roots of the New Value Corollary appear in the early Supreme
166
Court cases analyzing the Absolute Priority Rule. Both Boyd and
167
Case suggest that there may be situations in which old equity can
participate in the new debtor by contributing new value. In loose
dicta, the Boyd Court approved such a scenario, as long as the same
opportunity to participate was given to other stakeholders. It noted
that its decision did not mean it was necessary
to pay an unsecured creditor in cash as a condition of stockholders
retaining an interest in the reorganized company. His interest can
be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds
or preferred stock. If he declines a fair offer he is left to protect
himself as any other creditor of a judgment debtor, and, having
refused to come into a just reorganization, could not thereafter be
168
heard in a court of equity to attack it.

Citing Boyd, the Court in Case recognized that providing new equity
by allowing old equity holders an opportunity to participate by
infusing cash was not only permissible, it could be desirable, as old
equity may be the only or best source of needed cash for the
169
enterprise.
The Court was clear, however, that to avoid running
afoul of the Absolute Priority Rule, the interest the old shareholders
received in the new company would have to be “reasonably
170
equivalent” to the proposed contribution.
The Court found that
171
this additional cash infusion was not only permissible but necessary.
This exception, commonly known as the “New Value Corollary,” was
not codified in the Bankruptcy Code but has generally survived as a
judicially determined corollary (or exception) to the Absolute
172
Priority Rule.
166. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508 (1913).
167. Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121 (1939).
168. Boyd, 228 U.S. at 508.
169. Case, 308 U.S. at 121 (clarifying that under certain circumstances
stockholders may participate in the reorganization plan of an insolvent debtor
(citing both Boyd, 228 U.S. at 504, and Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cent. Union
Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445 (1926))).
170. Case, 308 U.S. at 121-22 (“[T]o accord ‘the creditor his full right of priority
against the corporate assets’ where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder’s
participation must be based on a contribution in money or in money’s worth,
reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of the
stockholder.”).
171. See id. at 121 (establishing that no objection can be made to old stockholder
participation in a reorganization where the success of the reorganization depends on
the infusion of new capital and where old stockholders make a fresh contribution in
exchange for a reasonably equivalent participation).
172. See Harvey R. Miller, John J. Rapisardi & Reginald A. Greene, Leaving Old
Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers The New Value
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On two occasions the United States Supreme Court has had the
opportunity to rule on the continued vitality and scope of the New
Value Corollary, but has failed to do so. In Norwest Bank Worthington
173
v. Ahlers, the debtors, who operated a family farm, opposed a
motion for relief from an automatic stay prohibiting the secured
174
Because the secured
creditor from foreclosing on its collateral.
creditor was undersecured, the bankruptcy court granted the motion,
holding that the debtors did not retain an equity interest in the
property, as they could not, given the Absolute Priority Rule, propose
a confirmable plan that would provide them with an interest in the
175
176
property. The district court agreed. The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and, citing Case, held that the Absolute Priority Rule
did not bar a plan that would allow the debtors to retain an interest
in the property subject to the secured lender’s liens “if they
contributed ‘money or money’s worth’ to the reorganized
177
enterprise.” It further held that the debtors’ “future contributions
of ‘labor, experience, and expertise’ . . . have ‘value’” and were
178
sufficient to constitute “money or money’s worth.”
179
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.
However, despite a specific request from the United States as amicus
curiae, the Court refused to rule that the New Value Corollary
discussed in Case had not survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy
180
Code.
Rather, it noted that “even if the [Case] exception to the
[A]bsolute [P]iority [R]ule has survived enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code, this exception does not encompass [debtors’] promise[s] to
contribute their ‘labor, experience, and expertise’ to the reorganized
enterprise . . . [which] is inadequate to gain the benefit of this

Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle
Street Partnership, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 553, 569-78 (2000) (discussing the
development and evolution of the New Value Corollary (Exception)).
173. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
174. See id. at 199-200 (detailing that the debtors obtained an automatic stay of
their creditors’ replevin action when they filed a petition for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code).
175. See id. at 200 (stating that the bankruptcy court upheld the creditors’ motion
for relief from the automatic stay because the debtors’ reorganization plan was
infeasible).
176. See id. (explaining that the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s
initial decision to grant the creditors relief from the automatic stay).
177. Id. at 201.
178. Id. at 203 (citing In re Ahlers, 794 F.2d 388, 402 (8th Cir. 1986)).
179. See id. at 206 (“[W]e find no support in the Code or our previous decisions
for the Court of Appeals’ application of the absolute priority rule in this case.”).
180. See id. at 203 n.3 (contending that it does not need to determine if any
exceptions exist to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule to resolve the
current dispute).
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181

exception.” In more colloquial terms, sweat equity does not rise to
money or money’s worth. Thus, the Court noted that there are no
exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code
beyond those that existed in its case law at the time of the 1978
182
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
183
In North LaSalle, the Supreme Court once again balked at
definitively stating whether or not the New Value Corollary survived
184
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Court made clear,
however, that if a New Value Corollary exists, the consideration given
to the former equity holders in exchange for new value must be
subject to a “market test” (i.e., the opportunity to contribute value in
exchange for such distribution must be offered to others in a
competitive manner, or others must be permitted to file competing
185
plans of reorganization).
North LaSalle was a single-asset partnership real estate case where
the debtor proposed a plan in which the bank, an undersecured
creditor, was to receive payment over time for the secured portion of
its claim and a payment of approximately 16% of value for its
186
separately classified (unsecured) deficiency claim. The other class
187
of unsecured creditors was to be paid 100% of their allowed claims.
Under the plan certain former partners of the debtor (old equity)
would contribute to the reorganized debtor a present value of
approximately $4.1 million over time in exchange for all the equity of
188
the reorganized debtor.
The opportunity to contribute value to
participate in the reorganized company was exclusive to the former
181. Id.
182. See id. at 206 (holding that the language of the Bankruptcy Code and its
legislative history bar any expansion of exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule
beyond those that existed in 1978, when Congress enacted the Code).
183. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434
(1999).
184. See id. at 454 (maintaining that the Court will not decide in this case whether
it will recognize the New Value Corollary).
185. See id. at 454-55 (discussing reasons why the New Value Corollary must allow
others, besides the debtor’s partners, an opportunity to compete for equity or
propose an alternative reorganization plan, otherwise the New Value Corollary is
doomed).
186. See id. at 440 (describing key elements of the debtor’s plan). Section 506(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code defines secured and unsecured status providing that
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . ., and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor’s interest . . . is
less than the amount of such allowed claim
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
187. North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 440.
188. See id. (observing that the plan allowed certain of the debtor’s former
partners to contribute $6.125 million in new capital over the course of five years).
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189

partners.
The plan proponents relied upon the New Value
Corollary.
After the bank voted to reject the plan, the debtor sought
confirmation under the cramdown provision of § 1129(b) of the
190
Bankruptcy Code.
The bank argued that the plan violated the
Absolute Priority Rule on its face because the plan provided for old
equity to become the equity holder of the reorganized debtor while
191
its unsecured claim was not satisfied in whole.
However, the
bankruptcy court confirmed the plan, and the district court and the
192
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari to resolve the split in the courts of
appeals over the New Value Corollary and whether it survived the
193
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Supreme Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code did not refer
194
to or provide for the New Value Corollary. The legislative history,
however, was not clear regarding whether this omission meant that
Congress rejected the New Value Corollary. Specifically, although
early drafts of the House version of the bill that would become the
Bankruptcy Code contained explicit language condoning the New
Value Corollary, the House bill that emerged did not contain such
195
language.
The Court did not, however, view this exclusion as a
definitive rejection of the continuing viability of the New Value
Corollary. Rather, because the language of the Absolute Priority Rule
prohibited old equity holders from receiving any consideration “on
account of” their old equity interests if senior classes had not been
satisfied or consented, the Court concluded that the New Value
189. See id. at 440-41 (discussing that the bank objected to this provision and
blocked confirmation of the plan).
190. See id. (allowing the debtor to force the plan on the dissenting class).
191. See id. at 442 (maintaining that the bank read the Absolute Priority Rule as
conflicting with the debtor’s plan because it allowed old equity holders in the debtor
to have property even though the bank’s unsecured claim was not paid in full).
192. Id.
193. See id. at 443. The Ninth and Seventh Circuits (the latter in North LaSalle)
had upheld confirmation of plans that provided equity with a distribution under the
New Value Corollary. See id. (citing In re Bonner Mall P’ship, 2 F.3d 899, 910-16 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1039, vacatur denied and appeal dismissed as moot, 513
U.S. 18 (1994)). In contrast, the Second and Fourth Circuits had disapproved
similar plans, although they did not explicitly reject the New Value Corollary. See id.
(citing In re Coltex Loop Cent. Three Partners, L.P., 138 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir.
1998), In re Bryson Props., XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 1992)).
194. See North LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 446 (observing that Congress had an opportunity
to include the New Value Corollary into the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, but it chose not
to address it).
195. See id. at 446-47 (recounting that after an extensive mark-up session, the
House produced a bill, which eventually would become the Bankruptcy Code, that
no longer contained the New Value Corollary).
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Corollary could arguably be implied from the language of the
196
Bankruptcy Code.
The Court then discussed the various possible interpretations of
the phrase “on account of,” rejecting “in exchange for” and “in
197
satisfaction of” and settling on “because of.”
The Court also
examined two potential interpretations of the causal connection
required to trigger the Absolute Priority Rule. First, it looked at a
definition that would hold any distribution of consideration to old
equity holders to be “on account of” their old equity interests (an
interpretation that would essentially destroy the New Value
198
Corollary).
Second, a less restrictive definition that would permit
equity holders to receive a distribution as long as the distribution was
adding at least as much value as could be obtained from an outside
199
source.
The Court strongly hinted that it favored the latter interpretation
and that the New Value Corollary, as a result, was a valid corollary to
200
the Absolute Priority Rule.
However, the Court refused to decide
the issue because the plan in this case failed even under the more
201
permissive definition. Specifically, the Court found that regardless
of the value provided by the old equity holders in North LaSalle, the
plan was flawed. It violated the Absolute Priority Rule by giving such
holders the exclusive right to purchase the equity in the reorganized
202
debtor, a valuable right, because of their equity holdings.
In
196. See id. at 447-49 (finding that it is possible that the Absolute Priority Rule
found in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 may contain the New Value Corollary).
197. See id. at 449-51 (arguing that “on account of” means “because of” based on
other provisions in the statute where these two phrases mean the same thing).
198. See id. at 451-53 (criticizing the definition proposed by the government,
which contended that any relationship between earlier interests and retained
property will create a bar to a plan providing for retained property, based on the text
of the Absolute Priority Rule in the Bankruptcy Code).
199. See id. at 453-54 (suggesting that this more flexible reading of “on account of”
would bar a plan if old equity obtained or preserved an ownership interest for a price
less than what others in the market would have paid).
200. The Court noted that allowing a New Value Corollary would “reconcile the
two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going concerns and
maximizing property available to satisfy creditors.” Id. at 453. “A truly full value
transaction . . . would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any
reorganization, provided of course that the contribution be in cash or be realizable
money’s worth.” Id. at 453-54.
201. See id. at 454 (rejecting the need to decide which definition of “on account
of” should prevail in this case because it is unnecessary for its decision).
202. See id. at 454-55 (“At the moment of the plan’s approval the Debtor’s partners
necessarily enjoyed an exclusive opportunity that was in no economic sense
distinguishable from the advantage of the exclusively entitled offeror or option
holder. This opportunity should, first of all, be treated as an item of property in its
own right.”). The Court saw no justification for old equity having the exclusive
option:
If the price to be paid for the equity interest is the best obtainable, old equity
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connection with the implementation of the New Value Corollary, the
Court, in dicta, noted that an exclusive option was inherently flawed
because it required the bankruptcy court, rather than the market, to
make the determination of whether the value provided by old equity
203
was reasonably equivalent to the consideration to be received. The
Court thus held that if the New Value Corollary exists, the old equity
holders cannot be permitted to obtain equity in a reorganized debtor
unless the opportunity to acquire the equity is subject to a market
204
test.
Lower courts and the Bar have found the Court’s opinion in North
LaSalle less than clear. Not only was the circuit split on the existence
of the New Value Corollary left unresolved, but the decision also
raised new questions about what exactly a “market test” would
205
entail.
For those courts that recognize the New Value Corollary,
the generally accepted elements are that the value be “(1) new,
(2) substantial, (3) money or money’s worth, (4) necessary for a
successful reorganization, and (5) reasonably equivalent to the value
206
or interest received.”
Accordingly, while the New Value Corollary
may put junior or equity interests back into “play” in some Chapter
11 scenarios, its requirements are difficult to meet.
B. The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition
The Unfair Discrimination Prohibition (as well as the rules
regarding classification of claims) pursues many of the same
equitable objectives as the Absolute Priority Rule, but it does so by
monitoring the plan treatment of similarly situated creditors.
Whereas the Absolute Priority Rule guards against unfair treatment
between creditors of different priorities (a vertical test), the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition is concerned with ensuring that similarly

does not need the protection of exclusiveness (unless to trump an equal
offer from someone else); if it is not the best, there is no apparent reason for
giving old equity a bargain. There is no reason, that is, unless the very
purpose of the whole transaction is, at least in part, to do old equity a favor.
Id. at 456.
203. See id. at 457 (arguing that one of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’s important
changes is that it limits a court’s responsibility for making value judgments).
204. Id. at 457-58 (contending that for the sake of statutory consistency and policy
reasons favoring competition, old equity holders cannot obtain new equity unless
their position is subject to a market test).
205. See Robert J. Keach, LaSalle, the “Market Test” and Competing Plans: Still in the
Fog, 21-Jan AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (2003) (suggesting that the existence of the New
Value Corollary and its corresponding “market test” remain unresolved issues).
206. See, e.g., In re Hoffinger Indus., 321 B.R. 498, 510 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005)
(citing Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall P’ship),
2 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 1993)).
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situated creditors are treated equally, absent a compelling reason to
207
do otherwise (a horizontal test).
1. Equity receiverships
Like the Absolute Priority Rule, the Unfair Discrimination
208
Prohibition grew out of the equity receiverships of railroads. While
railroad secured bondholders and stockholders were squeezing out
unsecured creditors through “insider” receivership sales (the
209
behavior that led to the Absolute Priority Rule, as discussed above),
they were also forcing out minority secured creditors and equity
holders that were not part of the syndicate to reacquire the railroad
company. For example, while unsecured creditors were getting paid
nothing, and the investor syndicate was getting back its company at
bargain prices, other secured creditors and stockholders were being
forced to take their share of the proceeds of the receivership sale,
which, as noted above, were generally much less than the market
210
value of the assets.
Unsecured creditors initially used fraudulent transfer laws in an
attempt to protect their interests before the Absolute Priority Rule
was created. In contrast, the secured creditors who were left out did
not want the receivership sales voided as fraudulent; they just wanted
a larger recovery. Instead of being paid out in cash (at a discount),
they wanted a share of the reorganized company. Over time, courts
heard their pleas and often agreed that equity required equality of
207. See Markell, supra note 7, at 231 (contending that Unfair Discrimination
Prohibition cases present an interesting dichotomy between the vertical and
horizontal equity tests, but cautioning that at the time these tests were developed
they were not formally recognized).
208. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 41-43 (explaining that a large portion
of equity receivership law is rooted in the historic treatment of insolvent railroads);
Markell, supra note 7, at 228-29 (discussing the long history of statutory provisions
that guard against plans that discriminate unfairly).
209. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the history and evolution of the Absolute
Priority Rule with regard to equity receiverships).
210. See Markell, supra note 7, at 229-31 (exploring the origin of the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition). In Part I.A of Markell’s article, he uses Ring v. New
Auditorium Pier Co., 77 A. 1054 (N.J. Ch. 1910) as an example of unfair
discrimination. Id. at 230. In that case, Ring was a bondholder that held $5,000 of a
$75,000 secured bond issuance. Id. Ring was not part of the bondholder syndicate
that purchased the reorganizing company for only $10,000 at the foreclosure sale.
Id. Instead of what would have been his share of the new bonds issued by the
reorganized company, he was scheduled to receive only his share of the $10,000. Id.
Ring sued for his share of the new bonds and the court ruled in his favor. Id. It cited
the lack of full notice to Ring of the foreclosure and the plan to repurchase the
company as decisive equitable factors. Id. Markell concludes that in Ring and other
cases, courts “recognized that regardless of the effect on other classes of creditors
and stakeholders, reorganizations had to be fair within each class created.” Id. at
231.
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distribution, and, therefore, that they should receive a share of the
reorganized company if other similarly situated creditors were also
211
receiving a share of the reorganized company.
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Section 77 (the railroad provision) did not initially contain an
unfair discrimination prohibition when it was added to the
212
Bankruptcy Act in 1933.
However, when § 77B, which applied to
business corporations, was added in 1934, it required that plans not
213
A year later, Congress amended § 77 to
discriminate unfairly.
mirror the confirmation requirements of § 77B, which included the
214
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.
While these sections provided
that to confirm a reorganization plan, the court had to find that the
plan did not discriminate unfairly, no explanation of the Unfair
215
Discrimination Prohibition was provided.
3. The Chandler Act
In 1938, Congress enacted the Chandler Act, which replaced § 77B
(the general corporate reorganization provision) with three new
216
The Railroad
debtor relief provisions: Chapters 10, 11, and 12.
217
provision, § 77, was not changed by the Chandler Act.
The
Chandler Act did not include the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition
in its new chapters, although the sparse legislative history suggests
that the omission was less intentional than it was a result of an
erroneous conflation of the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition with
218
Specifically, the
the Absolute Priority Rule by the Act’s drafters.
following questionable explanation was provided:
Subsection (2) of Section 221 [of the Chandler Act], derived from
Section 77B(f)(1) [of the former Bankruptcy Act], provides, as a
condition to confirmation of a plan, that the judge be satisfied that
it is ‘fair and equitable,’ and ‘feasible.’ Implicit in the former

211. See id. at 230-31 (explaining that since receivership has equity origins, the
process needs to provide equal opportunities for shareholders with similar interests).
212. See id. at 232 (noting that railroad reorganization plans only had to be “fair”
and not necessarily “equitable” according to the language of section 77 when
Congress enacted it in 1933).
213. See id. at 232 (discussing how section 77B required plans to be both “fair and
equitable, and not discriminate unfairly”).
214. See id.
215. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 42 (stating that Congress refused to
discuss what unfair discrimination meant).
216. See id. (citing Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840).
217. See Markell, supra note 7, at 233.
218. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 42 (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1916, at 35-36
(1938)).
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phrase is a prohibition against any unfair discrimination in the
plan in favor of any creditors or stockholders and the express
219
statement to that effect in Section 77B is therefore unnecessary.

4. Pre-code application of the unfair discrimination prohibition
Nevertheless, courts still entertained confirmation objections from
creditors arguing that, under the proposed plan, they had been
unfairly discriminated against. In two cases in the 1940s, American
220
United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park and Mason v.
221
Paradise Irrigation District, the Supreme Court suggested that the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition survived the enactment of the
Chandler Act. Both of the cases related to municipal bankruptcies
222
under Chapter 9.
In Avon Park, a fiscal agent performed services for the debtor and
received payments pursuant to the plan that objecting similarly
situated creditors argued went beyond mere compensation for
services and amounted to unfair discrimination. The Court agreed
and reversed the confirmation of the plan, stating:
Compositions under Ch. IX, like compositions under the old §12,
envisage equality of treatment of creditors. Under that section and its
antecedents, a composition would not be confirmed where one
creditor was obtaining some special favor or inducement not
accorded the others, whether that consideration moved from the
debtor or from another . . . In absence of a finding that the
aggregate emoluments receivable by the [fiscal agent] interests
were reasonable, measured by the services rendered, it cannot be
said that the consideration accruing to them, under or as a
consequence of the adoption of the plan, likewise accrued to all
other creditors, of the same class. Accordingly, the imprimatur of
223
the federal court should not have been placed on this plan.

In Mason, the Court heard a similar objection by dissenting
creditors; however, the Court found the discrimination in that plan
was justified. The Court stated:
[i]t has long been recognized in reorganization law that those who
put new money into the distressed enterprise may be given a
participation in the reorganization plan reasonably equivalent to
their contribution . . . . Without the inducement new money could
not be obtained . . . . The [preferred creditor] contributes
219. Id.
220. 311 U.S. 138 (1940).
221. 326 U.S. 536 (1946).
222. These two cases also figure prominently in the development of the rules on
classification. See supra note 23.
223. Avon Park, 311 U.S. at 148-49 (emphasis added).

MILLER

1386

6/28/2006 9:15:42 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1345

something that the [dissenting bondholder] does not . . . . That
224
difference warrants a difference in treatment.

Thus, as long as the special treatment to the co-equal creditor was
in exchange for additional value provided by the creditor, such
225
treatment was deemed proper, justified, and fair.
5. The Bankruptcy Code
Although it does not appear that the Unfair Discrimination
Prohibition was ever considered by an appellate court between Mason
226
and the adoption of the proposal of the Bankruptcy Code, the 1978
Bankruptcy Code codified the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in
cramdown situations.
The legislative history of the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition in the Bankruptcy Code does not provide
much guidance as to Congress’s intentions. It appears that much
more thought went into the Absolute Priority Rule and that the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was often confused with the
227
Absolute Priority Rule during the drafting of section 1129(b).
Ultimately, Congress placed the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in
§ 1129(b)(1) as an additional requirement to be met in cramdown
228
situations along with the Absolute Priority Rule. In floor comments
discussing the proposed Bankruptcy Code, its sponsors noted that the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition was added for “clarity,” although it
229
is not clear at all what is meant by clarity.
The only somewhat helpful illustration of the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition is found in the House Report; however, it
is only useful in the subordination context. It states that “[f]rom the
perspective of unsecured trade claims, there is no unfair
discrimination as long as the total consideration given all other
classes of equal rank does not exceed the amount that would result
230
from an exact aliquot distribution.”
The House Report essentially
explains that distributions to unsecured classes, which are different
224. Mason, 326 U.S. at 542-43.
225. Id. at 543 (noting that the plan must be transparent and cannot discriminate
unfairly).
226. See Markell, supra note 7, at 235.
227. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 37-39.
228. See id. at 38.
229. See Markell, supra note 7, at 236 n.47 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 32,407 & 34,006
(1978) (statements of Rep. Edwards and Sen. DeConcini) (“The requirement of the
House bill that a plan not ‘discriminate unfairly’ with respect to a class is included
for clarify; the language in the House report interpreting that requirement, in the
context of subordinated debentures, applies equally under the requirements of
section 1129(b)(1) of the House amendment.”).
230. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 39-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at
417 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6373).
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from one another as a result of the enforcement of subordination
agreements between senior and junior creditors, do not violate the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, but suggests that any other
difference in treatment would be unfair and, consequently,
231
prohibited.
6. Unfair discrimination in practice
Courts considering the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition have
applied different interpretations to it, which can be grouped into
four different broad categories: (1) courts that apply the rule strictly
so that all similarly situated creditors are required to receive the exact
same treatment; (2) courts that apply the rule only in the context of
subordinated claims or interest; (3) courts that permit discrimination
if it is fair and apply some form of a four-part test to determine
fairness; and (4) courts that similarly permit fair discrimination but,
232
rather than use the four-part test, apply a reasonableness standard.
A minority of cases apply a strict reading to the Unfair
233
Discrimination Prohibition that bars any discrimination whatsoever.
231. See id. at 39-40 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 417 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6373). The following is an excerpt from the House Report:
[I]f trade creditors, senior debt, and subordinate debt are each owed $100
and the plan proposes to pay the trade debt $15, the senior debt $30, and
the junior debt $0, the plan would not unfairly discriminate against the trade
debt nor would any other allocation of consideration under the plan
between the senior and junior debt be unfair as to the trade debt as long as
the aggregate consideration is less than $30 . . .
Application of the test from the perspective of senior debt is best illustrated
by the plan that proposed to pay trade debt $15, senior debt $25, and junior
debt $0. Here the senior debt is being unfairly discriminated against with
respect to the equal trade debt even though the trade debt receives less than
the senior debt. The discrimination arises from the fact that the senior debt
is entitled to the rights of the junior debt which in this example entitle [sic]
the senior debt to share on a 2:1 basis with the trade debt.
Finally, it is necessary to interpret the first criterion from the perspective of
subordinated debt. The junior debt is subrogated to the rights of senior
debt once the senior debt is paid in full. Thus, while the plan that pays trade
debt $15, senior debt $25, and junior debt $0 is not unfairly discriminatory
against the junior debt, a plan that proposes to pay trade debt $55, senior
debt $100, and junior debt $1, would be unfairly discriminatory. In order to
avoid discriminatory treatment against the junior debt, at least $10 would
have to be recovered by such debt under those facts.
Id.
232. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 46-48.
233. See, e.g., In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1989), aff’d, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1274
(5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a plan that accorded the dissenting trade creditor class
the same treatment as another class of equal priority creditors—the deficiency claim
of undersecured secured creditors). When the dissenting class objected that the
estate could afford to provide it with a better recovery, the court noted that, since a
better recovery would come at the expense of the recovery of the similarly situated
class of creditors, such a “plan would prima facie ‘unfairly discriminate.’” The court

MILLER

1388

6/28/2006 9:15:42 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1345

This is the most conservative approach, because if the court does not
allow any “discrimination” whatsoever, then it can hardly be
234
“unfair.” The rigidity of this interpretation of unfair discrimination
ultimately undercuts the rehabilitative goals of the Bankruptcy Code
by not allowing debtors some flexibility in the “cramdown” context
and appears to ignore the fact that the term discrimination in
235
§ 1129(b)(1) is modified by the word “unfair.”
A different minority of courts has taken a similar strict approach to
the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition. These courts hold that the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition only applies if the plan
236
inappropriately involves subordination of claims or interests.
Under this rationale, disparate treatment among classes of creditors
237
with equal priority is not subject to scrutiny by the court. If the first
line of cases was too restrictive then certainly this line of cases is too
relaxed and offers debtors an opportunity to abuse the “cramdown”
power.
The majority of courts, however, permit some discrimination, as
long as they find that the discrimination is fair. Most of these courts
apply some variation of a multiple-part test to determine if
discrimination is fair, while other courts forego the rigidity of a test
238
and instead make a general equitable inquiry.
The court in In re
WorldCom articulated a variation of the multiple-part test for unfair
relied on legislative history from the House Report, which provided, in an example
explaining the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition: “From the perspective of
unsecured trade claims, there is no unfair discrimination as long as the total
consideration given all other classes of equal rank does not exceed the amount that
would result from an exact aliquot distribution.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 595, at
416).
234. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47 (noting that “by recognizing no
room for differences in treatment among similarly situated claimants, the approach
appears to equate ‘discrimination’ with ‘unfairness,’ rendering the latter
redundant”).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., In re Acequia, Inc., 787 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
the alleged disparate treatment between two shareholders regarding their voting
rights was irrelevant because the distribution did not involve subordination); In re
Martin, 66 B.R. 921, 929-30 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986) (finding disparate treatment
between an oversecured creditor and other creditors regarding scheduling of
payment irrelevant because it did not involve subordination); see also Denise R.
Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11: A Comprehensive Compilation of Current Case
Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 199-200 (referring to these cases as utilizing a
“Restrictive Approach”).
237. This reading of the Code is rooted in the legislative history. In re Acequia, 787
F.2d at 1364 n.18 (citing Sponsors’ Remarks, 124 CONG. REC. Hll, 104 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC. S17,420 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)).
238. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47-48 (describing how many courts use
a four part test that is highly subjective in nature and that frequently leads to
disparate results).
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discrimination: “To determine whether a plan discriminates unfairly,
courts consider whether (1) there is a reasonable basis for
discriminating, (2) the debtor cannot consummate the plan without
the discrimination, (3) the discrimination is proposed in good faith,
and (4) the degree of discrimination is in direct proportion to its
239
rationale.”
In WorldCom, the debtors provided disparate treatment to equal
priority classes based on different arguments the creditors in the
classes would have regarding the effect of substantive consolidation
on their claims. Specifically, it appeared that the creditors of the
former MCI subsidiaries might be prejudiced by substantive
consolidation, as they relied on the credit of MCI, which appeared to
have more value than the WorldCom entities. The court permitted
discrimination between classes, essentially providing a greater
recovery to the creditors of the former MCI entities, noting such
discrimination was justified as
[a] mechanism that enables the Debtors to recognize the unique
reliance and prejudice arguments of the holders of [three different
types of claims], which those creditors, as parties that extended
credit . . . , possess in relation to the substantive consolidation of
the WorldCom Debtors[. This] is a valid business justification and
reasonable basis for the disparate treatment of [four different types
240
of claims].

Also, the court held that “discrimination among [four classes]
under the plan is not unfair because it is appropriate, reasonably
proportional to the issues of the case and necessary to the
241
reorganization.”
The four-part test gives courts the flexibility to
look at specific facts and the relationships of similarly situated
creditors to the debtor and to the plan of reorganization, although it
has been criticized for its lack of predictability, among other
242
reasons.
Those courts that have been relatively open to discrimination but
do not confine their reasoning to a multiple-part test typically
239. In re WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 23861928, at *59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); cf.
In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 895-96 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (using
a four-part test); In re Aztec Co., 107 B.R. 585 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989).
240. In re WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *59.
241. Id. at *60.
242. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 47-48 (arguing, inter alia, that the test
will encourage inappropriate hold-out behavior); Polivy, supra note 236, at 205-06
(“The four-part test has its critics. Some courts have criticized the test as adding to
the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of unfair discrimination. They point out
the redundancy in the first and fourth prongs, which both ask whether the extent of
discrimination is reasonable.”). For a thorough critique of the four-part tests, see
Markell, supra note 7, at 242-46.
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examine the reasonableness and the achievability of a proposed
243
Generally, if the debtor presents an equitable rationale for
plan.
the discrimination among co-equal classes of creditors, these courts
244
will allow it.
The enforcement of the Unfair Discrimination
Prohibition in this context ends up being very similar to the four-part
test discussed above, but allows for greater elasticity.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GIFTING DOCTRINE
As noted, the gifting doctrine did not emerge as a radical proposal.
Rather, it developed slowly in incremental steps.
A. Legislative History of Gifting
The legislative history leading up to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code suggests that Congress was uncertain as to whether
to permit a senior creditor to circumvent the Absolute Priority Rule
or the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition by forgoing (or “gifting”) a
portion of its distribution in favor of stockholders despite that
intervening junior creditors would not be paid in full.
A Senate report written prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Code proposed that a senior creditor would be permitted to adjust
the value of its disbursement in the plan for the benefit of equity
holders despite that the junior creditors were not being paid in full
245
under the plan. Subsequently, two key legislators of the Bankruptcy
Code, Representative Don Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini
explicitly rejected this proposal and stated that “[c]ontrary to the
example contained in the Senate report, a senior class will not be
able to give up value to a junior class over the dissent of an
intervening class unless the intervening class receives the full amount,
246
as opposed to value, of its claims or interests.”
243. See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 19, at 48 (noting that “[this standard]
embraces fundamentally the perspective of ‘I know it when I see it,’ and is thus
unlikely to fulfill the underlying purposes of the unfair discrimination doctrine in
any defined or systematic way”).
244. See In re Salen Suede, Inc., 219 B.R. 922, 933-34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998)
(“Whether a plan unfairly discriminates is tested by an objective standard . . . ; any
discrimination must be supported by a legally acceptable rationale, and the extent of
the discrimination must be necessary in light of the rationale.”); In re 203 N. LaSalle
St. Ltd. P’ship, 190 B.R. 567, 585-86 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[I]t is possible at least
to lay a framework for measuring the fairness of a discrimination in Chapter 11
plans. First, any discrimination must be supported by a legally acceptable
rationale . . . . Second, the extent of the discrimination must be necessary in light of
the rationale.”), aff’d, 195 B.R. 692 (N.D. Ill. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir.
1997), rev’d on other grounds subnom. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. La
Salle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
245. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 127 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5913.
246. 124 CONG. REC. S. 34007 (Oct. 5, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 123
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The House Report, in connection with the bill that became the
Bankruptcy Code, described the effects of the Absolute Priority Rule,
but was silent about whether it would apply to a gift by one group of
creditors to the other:
The court may confirm [a plan] over the dissent of a class of
unsecured claims, including priority claims, only if the members of
the class are unimpaired, if they will receive under the plan
property of a value equal to the allowed amount of their unsecured
claims, or if no class junior will share under the plan. That is, if the
class is impaired, then they must be paid in full or, if paid less than
full, then no class junior may receive anything under the plan.
This codifies the absolute priority rule from the dissenting class on
247
down.

Although the statements by the bill’s sponsors appear to suggest
that they did not agree with the gifting concept, they are not
authoritative. There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code prohibiting
creditors from agreeing to give up their distributions and transferring
that consideration to other classes of claims or interests.
B. SPM
The case of Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee v. Stern (In re SPM
248
Manufacturing. Corp.) started the trend of condoning the ability of
creditors to “gift” around the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.
In SPM, the First Circuit held that creditors are generally free to do as
they please with their bankruptcy dividends, including sharing them
with other creditors, and that any resulting distribution does not
249
violate the distribution scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The facts
in SPM clearly supported that conclusion.
In SPM, the debtor owed $5.5 million to general unsecured
creditors and $9 million to Citizens Savings Bank, the holder of a
perfected first priority security interest in substantially all of the
250
debtor’s assets.
The IRS held an unsecured priority claim for
$750,000, which was personally guaranteed by the debtor’s president
251
and members of his family.
During the Chapter 11 case, in an effort to maximize the value of
the debtor’s estate through cooperation, Citizens Savings Bank and
CONG. REC. H. 32408 (Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
247. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6369.
248. 984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
249. Id. at 1313.
250. Id. at 1307.
251. Id.
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the official committee of unsecured creditors entered into a formal
agreement providing that they would work together to formulate a
252
In consideration, Citizens Savings Bank
plan of reorganization.
agreed to share whatever proceeds it received from its collateral
253
security with general unsecured creditors in a specified manner. As
a result of the agreement, general unsecured creditors would receive
a dividend even though the priority unsecured tax creditors,
254
including the IRS, would not.
After it became clear that SPM could not be successfully
reorganized, the bankruptcy court appointed a receiver, the debtor’s
assets were sold for $5 million, and the debtor’s Chapter 11 case was
255
converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Citizens Savings Bank and
the creditors’ committee then filed a joint motion requesting
distribution of the net sales proceeds to Citizens Savings Bank on
account of its first priority lien and providing that Citizens Savings
Bank would distribute a portion of the net proceeds to the creditors’
256
committee in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
The
debtor and its management, which would have been personally liable
for whatever portion of the IRS claim that was not paid out of the
estate, objected, arguing that the participation of general unsecured
creditors in the liquidation proceeds ahead of priority tax creditors
257
violated the distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy court agreed and ordered that the net proceeds be
distributed to Citizens Savings Bank and that Citizens Savings Bank
pay that the portion of the proceeds that would have otherwise been
distributed to the unsecured creditors under the agreement to the
Chapter 7 trustee for distribution to unsecured creditors in
258
accordance with the priority scheme under the Bankruptcy Code.
The effect of the order was that priority creditors and the insiders
who would be personally liable for the debtor’s obligation to the IRS
would benefit, while the general unsecured creditors would be

252. See id. at 1307-08 (recognizing that liquidation would not satisfy any of the
creditor’s claims).
253. Id. at 1308.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1309.
256. Id.
257. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 724-726). Section 726 of the Bankruptcy provides that
in a Chapter 7 case (as in a Chapter 11 case) certain tax claims have priority over
general unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 724-726 (2000).
258. Id. at 1309-10 (“[O]nce the committee was in operation it had to, it’s require
by law, to act for the benefit of the entire estate.”).
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deprived of any recovery.
The district court affirmed, and the
260
creditors’ committee appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
rejecting the argument that the agreement violated the distribution
261
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The court noted that as a secured
creditor, Citizens Savings Bank was entitled to receive all proceeds
from the sale of the debtor’s assets, as such proceeds were not
262
sufficient to satisfy its liens in full.
Further, “no one else had any
claim of right under the Bankruptcy Code” to Citizens Savings Bank’s
263
$5 million distribution. Because Citizens Savings Bank was entitled
to receive all such proceeds, it was free to do as it pleased with such
recoveries, including to distribute them to general unsecured
creditors. In oft-quoted language, the court noted: “While the debtor
and the trustee are not allowed to pay nonpriority creditors ahead of priority
creditors, creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish with the
bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them with other
264
creditors.”
Further, “[t]here is nothing in the Code forbidding
Citizens to have voluntarily paid part of these monies to some or all
of the general, unsecured creditors after the bankruptcy proceedings
265
finished.”
Critical to the court’s reasoning was that once the net proceeds
were properly distributed to Citizens Savings Bank on account of its
266
secured claim, the proceeds were no longer property of the estate.
Moreover, the “sharing between Citizens and the general, unsecured
creditors was to occur after distribution of the estate property, having
no effect whatever on the bankruptcy distribution to other
267
creditors.”
Until all liens on a debtor’s property are satisfied, the
distribution scheme under the Bankruptcy Code does not come into
268
play.
Accordingly, the court found that the agreement did not
distribute the debtor’s property “at the expense of priority
269
270
creditors” and upheld the agreement.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id. at 1313 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1313-14, 1318-19.
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C. SPM’s Progeny
In many respects, the SPM holding could be viewed as limited.
First, it involved a secured creditor whose entitlement to the proceeds
at issue was undisputed. Furthermore, the distribution of proceeds to
general unsecured creditors occurred outside of a Chapter 11 plan
271
and, as the court noted “after distribution of the estate property.”
In fact, the initial physical distribution was to be made to the secured
creditor, and the secured creditor would then make a physical
272
distribution to the creditors’ committee.
Under these
circumstances, the court noted that the Bankruptcy Code did not
prevent the secured creditor from transferring value to the general
273
unsecured creditors “after the bankruptcy proceedings finished.”
Despite the limited holding of SPM, bankruptcy professionals
pushed the envelope by using some of the broader language of SPM
to justify actions that would otherwise appear to be forbidden by the
Bankruptcy Code, at least facially. Courts have generally obliged.
Specifically, “creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish
with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including to share them
274
with other creditors,” has often been used to justify distributions
that, on their face, seem to violate either the Absolute Priority Rule
(by providing juniors with a recovery when an objecting class of
seniors is not paid in full) or the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition
(by providing a greater recovery to some creditors over the objection
of a less fortunate co-equal class). The SPM doctrine of “gifting” has
been expanded well beyond the concept that a secured creditor can
agree to share a portion of its recovery to other creditors after receipt
of proceeds in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
1. Secured creditor carveouts
The least controversial use of SPM is to permit carveouts of secured
creditors’ collateral. A typical carveout is an arrangement under
which secured creditors permit the use of a portion of their collateral
to pay administrative costs, such as attorney fees and possible
275
subsequent Chapter 7 expenses.
Carveouts are usually negotiated
as part of a Debtor-In-Possession (“DIP”) financing or cash collateral
agreements where, in the event of default on the DIP loan or cash
271. Id. at 1312.
272. Id. at 1309.
273. Id. at 1313.
274. Id.
275. See generally Richard B. Levin, Almost All You Ever Wanted To Know About Carve
Out, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 445 (2002).
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collateral agreement and resulting administrative insolvency of the
debtor, the DIP or secured lender agrees to a capped amount of
money extracted from the collateral (or in some cases added to the
276
secured debt) that will be used to pay administrative fees.
The
secured creditor’s motivation in providing this kind of protection is
to add value to the loan, add value to the debtor, and help ensure a
smooth administration of the estate. The theory is that certain
administrative creditors, especially professionals, would be unwilling
to provide services to a potentially administratively insolvent debtor.
The secured creditor with a lien on all the debtor’s assets is willing to
agree to the carve out because it believes that the value of the
debtor’s assets, and therefore its secured claim, will be increased by
277
the services provided by certain administrative creditors.
278
In In re Nuclear Imaging Systems, Inc., the court held that a secured
creditor may agree to a carveout from its secured claim to pay certain
administrative creditors of its choosing, without having to give the
proceeds to a Chapter 7 trustee to distribute in accordance the
279
Chapter 7 priority scheme.
Specifically, pursuant to a courtapproved cash collateral stipulation, the secured creditor agreed to a
carveout of $125,000 from its secured claim for postpetition
280
professionals’ fees of the debtor’s attorneys. The debtor’s counsel
had possession of the $125,000 and requested approval of such
281
amounts in a fee application.
Another administrative creditor
objected, arguing that such amounts must instead be distributed to
the Chapter 7 trustee to distribute pro rata to all administrative
282
expense claimants.
The court overruled the objection and, citing
SPM, held that a secured creditor is free to contract with any creditor
to pay such creditor from proceeds of the secured creditor’s
283
collateral.
The court explained that nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code requires that “proceeds—which would otherwise be payable
solely to the secured creditor but for its consent to transfer property
to a particular administrative claimant—must be paid to the trustee as

276. See id. at 445-46.
277. See id. (“[T]he carve out . . . may benefit the secured creditor, which might
have concluded that an orderly liquidation or restructuring process is likely to result
in the highest net recovery on its claim, even after payment of care out expenses.”).
278. 270 B.R. 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
279. Id. at 371-73.
280. Id. at 369.
281. Id. at 370.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 379-81.
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284

estate property.”
The court explicitly stated that the secured
285
creditor’s claim was not estate property.
2. Gifting to junior classes under a plan
286
The case of In re MCorp. Financial, Inc. expanded SPM even
further, permitting gifting (1) by an unsecured creditor, (2) directly
from the debtor’s estate (as opposed to directly from the gifting
creditor), and (3) under a Chapter 11 plan (where the Absolute
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition are
287
applicable). In MCorp., senior unsecured bondholders negotiated a
Chapter 11 plan of liquidation with the debtors and the creditors’
committee, whereby the senior bondholders agreed to accept less
than the full amount of their claims, while providing a nominal
recovery to junior bondholders and a recovery to the FDIC, the latter
288
being in settlement of prepetition litigation.
The senior
bondholders agreed to pay the FDIC despite that they were not being
paid in full, because they decided they would be better off settling
with the FDIC and receiving an earlier recovery than spending years
289
litigating with the FDIC.
The junior bondholders rejected the plan and argued that it
violated the Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions (the Absolute
290
Priority Rule and the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition), because
the FDIC, which was arguably junior in priority to the junior
bondholders, was receiving a recovery before the junior bondholders
291
were paid in full.
The court rejected the junior bondholders’
arguments, and, citing SPM, held that the recovery to the FDIC was
proper because it was being paid by the senior bondholders out of
292
their higher priority distribution.
The court appeared to adopt a
284. Id. at 379.
285. Id. at 380; see In re White Glove, Inc., 1998 WL 731611, *7 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1998) (citing SPM to support holding that a secured creditor in Chapter 7 is
permitted to carve out a portion of the proceeds of its collateral to pay some
administrative creditors of its choosing).
286. 160 B.R. 941 (S.D. Tex 1993).
287. See id.
288. Id. at 948.
289. Id.
290. They actually appear to have confused the two provisions, but the result is the
same. See id. at 960 (using the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition in conjunction with
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which describes the conditions a plan must meet to be
fair and equitable with respect to a class of unsecured claims, to determine that the
plans pass the statutory test).
291. See id. (detailing the juniors’ argument that the requirement in the Code that
a plan does not discriminate unfairly means that the junior bondholders, by statute,
should get paid before the FDIC).
292. See id. (determining that as long as the juniors receive as much as they are
supposed if the seniors did not share their higher priority share then the regulation
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general rule that a senior class of unsecured creditors may share its
distribution under a debtor’s Chapter 11 plan with a junior class of
creditors, as long as the classes between the two receive “at least as
293
much as what they would without the sharing.” The court similarly
implied that unfair discrimination is not implicated when a senior
class of creditors chooses to share its distribution with one junior class
of creditors while not sharing anything with another class of creditors
294
of equal priority to the junior class of creditors.
The court explicitly stated that the fact that the senior creditor in
SPM was secured was “not relevant;” rather, “it was the creditor’s
status as prior to the IRS that allowed it to share with those under the
IRS, just as the seniors’ priority over the juniors allows them to fund
295
the FDIC settlement.”
In addition, implicit in the Mcorp. court’s
ruling were: (1) the fact that the distribution in SPM was outside a
plan was not relevant; and (2) the fact that the distribution to
unsecured creditors in SPM was to be paid directly from the senior
creditor to the junior creditor, as opposed to from the debtor’s
296
estate, was not relevant.
3. Gifting to equity under a plan
The SPM doctrine was further expanded in In re Genesis Health
297
Ventures, Inc. to condone a distribution to equity holders, “gifted” by
298
senior secured lenders, while creditors were not being paid in full.
In Genesis, the debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization included a
distribution under a new management incentive plan to certain
directors and officers, who were prepetition equity holders, which
included stock, loan forgiveness, waivers, releases, exculpation, and
299
other value. The court held that the Absolute Priority Rule was not
violated by this distribution under the New Management Incentive
Plan even though creditors were not being paid in full, because the
distribution “represents an allocation of the enterprise value
is not violated).
293. Id.
294. See id. (noting that all equity is treated alike under the plan where the claims
are paid before equity is paid).
295. Id.
296. See id. (indicating the only relevant factor in the SPM opinion in evaluating
the junior bondholders’ claim is that the secured creditor could share its proceeds
with a creditor of a lower priority than the IRS).
297. In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
298. See id. at 617-18 (allowing Senior Lenders to determine how to allocate their
value without violating the fair and equitable requirement of the Code).
299. See id. at 617 (describing the New Management Incentive Plan which
provided benefits among forty-three management employees whose benefits were
derived from value that would have gone to the Senior Lenders).
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otherwise distributable to the Senior [secured] Lenders, which the
Senior Lenders have agreed to offer to [management] . . . . The
Senior Lenders are free to allocate such value without violating the
300
‘fair and equitable’ requirement.”
4. Gifting to select unsecured classes under a plan
a.

Cases approving selective gifting

Courts have similarly applied SPM’s gifting doctrine to approve
distributions under Chapter 11 plans that would otherwise violate the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition. Specifically, in In re Parke Imperial
301
Canton, Ltd., the court held that the secured creditors’ allocation of
a portion of their distribution from the plan of reorganization to one
class of unsecured creditors but not another class of unsecured
creditors does not constitute unfair discrimination under § 1129(b)
302
of the Bankruptcy Code.
In that case, the secured creditors
proposed a plan that divided the unsecured creditors into two
303
Classes—13 and 14. Although both classes would share pro rata in
300. Id. at 618. The District Court for the Southern District of New York also
recently held that the Absolute Priority Rule is not implicated when a senior
(secured) creditor shares its distribution. Specifically, the court in Motorola, Inc. v.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC) held that a secured
creditor’s agreement to fund a litigation trust to pursue litigation against a particular
unsecured creditor and share the proceeds of the litigation trust with the debtor’s
estate does not violate the Absolute Priority Rule. No. 01Civ.5429(GBD), 2005 WL
756900, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2005). In Iridium, the statutory committee of
unsecured creditors and the agent for the debtor’s senior secured lenders entered
into a settlement agreement whereby the creditors’ committee agreed not to contest
the validity of the lenders’ liens and the lenders agreed that the estates could use $47
million that they would have otherwise received on account of their secured claims to
fund a litigation trust to sue Motorola, an administrative creditor. Id. at *2. The
settlement agreement further provided that the proceeds of the litigation trust would
be shared in a specified manner between the lenders and the debtor’s estates. Id.
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement agreement, and Motorola appealed,
arguing that the $47 million used to fund a litigation trust to pursue litigation against
Motorola is an improper distribution of estate moneys. Id. at *3-5. The district court
rejected Motorola’s argument, holding that, under SPM, the $47 million used to
fund the litigation trust belonged to the lender and was not estate money; therefore,
the priority scheme for distribution of estate assets under the Bankruptcy Code was
not implicated. Id. at *7. In dicta, the court stated that SPM cannot be used to
violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, but rested its holding on the fact that
the $47 million was not estate money: “On these facts, the priority scheme for the
distribution of estate assets under the Bankruptcy Code is not implicated, let alone
violated.” Id.
301. In re Parke Imperial Canton, Ltd., No. 93-61004, 1994 WL 842777 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 1994).
302. See id. at *11 (noting that the “cramdown” requirements of the Bankruptcy
Code applied in this plan because several classes were impaired under the plan, and
therefore the plan could not discriminate unfairly).
303. See id. at *2 (outlining all of the classes of the plan including Class 13, a class
of unsecured claims that most of the other 12 classes paid into, and Class 14 which
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the remaining proceeds after compensation of the secured claims,
the secured creditors agreed to contribute up to $10,000 to
guarantee that Class 13, but not Class 14, would receive at least a ten
304
percent recovery.
The court cited SPM in rejecting an argument
that this additional recovery to only one of two equal priority classes
305
violated the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.
The WorldCom Court took SPM further than any other court up to
that point, by finding that by voting to accept a plan of
reorganization, a class of claims can be “deemed” to have “gifted” a
portion of its recovery to another class of creditors, and that the
additional recovery received by the recipients is not subject to attack
as unfair discrimination or, presumably, as violative of the Absolute
306
Priority Rule.
In WorldCom, an Ad Hoc Committee of Trade
Creditors, consisting of some but not all trade creditors of the
substantively consolidated debtors, objected to the plan of
307
reorganization as originally filed.
To settle the objection,
representatives of classes consisting of certain senior and
subordinated bond claims agreed that their classes would forgo a
portion of the plan consideration allocated to them and would
provide such consideration to the members of the Ad Hoc
308
Committee of Trade Creditors.
The debtors thereafter amended the plan to provide that
acceptances of the plan by the classes of bond claims would constitute
an agreement by all holders of claims in such classes to distribute a
portion of their recovery to members of the ad hoc trade
309
committee.
The debtors solicited the votes of the classes of bond
claims again, which were to receive a lower recovery as a result of the
agreement made by certain bondholders, representatives on their

was the other unsecured claim class).
304. Id.
305. See id. at *11 (taking note that the 10 percent guarantee will not be paid from
the estate, so SPM controls because Classes 13 and 14 are sharing equally in the
distribution of proceeds).
306. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 23861928, at *60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(reasoning that the discrimination among the classes in the reorganization plan is
not unfair because it is “appropriate, reasonably proportional to the issues of the case
and necessary to the reorganization”).
307. See id. at *14 (noting that the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee was not the
only objecting party, the Ad Hoc Committee of Dissenting Bondholders, Platinum
Fund, a German back, and HSBC all objected to the original plan as well).
308. See id. at *14-15 (arguing a that it relied on pre-merger trade claims, the Ad
Hoc Trade Claims Committee settled its objections by treating debt claims by
reducing the recovery of the holders of those claims).
309. See id. (classifying these claims as MCI Pre-merger claims to allow for
additional recoveries by the classes that had reliance claims).
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behalf, and both such classes overwhelmingly voted to accept the
310
plan.
Upon request of the court, the debtors deemed the Ad Hoc
Committee of Trade Creditors to be a separate class from the
debtors’ other trade creditors and deemed the class of other trade
311
creditors to reject the plan.
As a result, the debtors pursued
confirmation of the plan under the cramdown provisions of
312
§ 1129(b).
The court then confirmed the plan, holding that it satisfied
313
§ 1129(b)(2) with respect to the deemed rejecting class.
Citing
SPM, the court held that the enhanced recovery for the Ad Hoc
Committee of Trade Creditors did not constitute “unfair
discrimination” in violation of the Bankruptcy Code,
because the Contributions are the result of other creditors . . .
voluntarily sharing their recovery under the Plan with the members
of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims Committee . . . . The greater
value received by the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims
Committee is not the result of the Debtors’ distribution of estate
310. See id. at *75-76 (describing the voting procedures that allowed the senior
debtors to reconsider their vote since they were going to get less recovery because of
the compromise to allow for recovery to the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee to
come from holders of debt claims).
311. See id. at *18-19 (determining that separating Class 6 into Class 6A [MCI PreMerger Claims] and 6B [Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee] made the voting
procedures fairer because although the two groups recovered the same, the Ad Hoc
Trade Claims Committee could potentially have undue influence over the rest of the
class). Although facially, it would appear that some members of a class receiving a
greater recovery under a plan than other members of the class would violate section
1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court held that the Ad Hoc Committee
members were receiving the same treatment as the trade creditors under the plan.
Id. at *17-18. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000) (“a plan shall . . . provide
the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder
of a particular claim or interest agrees to a less favorable treatment of such particular
claim or interest.”). “Any enhanced value received by holders of [claims in the class
of members of the Ad Hoc committee] on account of contributions from other
Classes is not a treatment of these Claims under the plan and does not constitute
unfair discrimination.” WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *60. It appears that
because the additional recovery to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee was
coming through a “contribution” from other classes, the court did not consider it to
be a distribution to such creditors for treatment purposes. Id. In fact, although
separate classification of the Ad Hoc Trade Committee would generally have raised
concerns under section 1122, the court simply ignored these by finding that the
claims of the Ad Hoc Committee members “are separately classified for voting
purposes and not for treatment purposes.” Id.
312. See id. at *45 (noting that the cramdown mechanism allows the debtors to
recognize the discrimination arguments of different classes, but still allows for the
plan to go through because there is a reasonable basis for disparate treatment).
313. See id. at *60 (ruling that the discrimination among the various classes of
unsecured claims is not unfair discrimination because there is a reasonable basis for
the discrimination between the classes and the discrimination is needed to execute
the reorganization plan).
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property to such creditors. Creditors are generally free to do
whatever they wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive,
including sharing them with other creditors, so long as recoveries
314
received under the Plan by other creditors are not impacted.

The court noted that the contributions were “not coming from or
diminishing the estate, but rather, [were] coming from and
diminishing the previously accepted recovery of the holders of
315
[senior and subordinated bond claims].”
Moreover, “[i]f the
Contributions were not made, the amounts represented thereby
would not inure to the benefit of any [claims in the class deemed to
reject], but rather would be paid under the Plan and remain available
316
to the Classes contributing the respective amounts.”
The court also held that the plan of reorganization did not violate
the Absolute Priority Rule because no class of claims or equity
interests junior to the deemed rejected class was receiving any
317
property of the debtor under the plan.
The court noted that the
“absolute priority rule is inapplicable to contributions of Plan
recoveries made by certain creditors to other creditors. Agreements
by creditors to share their recoveries under a plan of reorganization
with other creditors need not benefit an entire class. Moreover, the
318
contributing creditor need not be a secured creditor.”
Although WorldCom and the court were insistent that the
additional recovery to the members of the Ad Hoc Trade Claims
Committee was not estate property, and that they were getting the
same “treatment” as other trade creditors, the use of the plan process
to achieve this “gifting” for the benefit of some trade creditors, but
319
not others, makes WorldCom different from other cases.
First, the
agreement by the bondholders to contribute consideration to the

314. Id. at *61 (citing In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993))
(other citations omitted).
315. Id. at *24.
316. Id. at *25.
317. See id. at *61 (citing SPM for the proposition that creditors are free to do
what they want with the proceeds as long as it does not diminish the recovery of
other creditors, and the increased recovery for the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee
is not the result of distribution of estate property).
318. Id. (internal citations omitted).
319. See id. (recognizing that the contribution is not coming from the estate, but
rather the recovery of the holders of the Senior Debt Claims, and citing to SPM to
support the proposition that the distribution to the Ad Hoc Trade Committee is not
a distribution of estate property but rather a distribution of the creditors’ own
bankruptcy dividends). But see In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 894
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (rejecting the argument from a secured creditor that a
plan to distribute assets to one class of unsecured creditors and not another was not a
distribution of the estate because the distribution specifically includes assets that are
part of litigation claims of the secured creditors against the debtors).
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trade committee was a “deemed” contribution, achievable only
320
Unlike other cases where the creditors
through the plan process.
making the contribution explicitly agreed to do so, in WorldCom,
certain large members of the classes agreed that the entire class
would make the contribution, and by voting to accept the plan, the
321
class was “deemed” to have agreed to make the contribution.
Although the class overwhelmingly voted to accept the plan, it did
not do so unanimously. Thus, unlike in any other case expanding
SPM, a creditor that did not want to make the distribution was forced
322
to do so. Moreover, unlike those other cases where the “gift” could
have at least happened outside the plan context, in WorldCom, the gift
was dependent on the plan solicitation process and plan voting
guidelines.
In addition, the WorldCom Chapter 11 plan made the distinction
between the creditors receiving the distribution (i.e., the noisy
objectors) and those that did not (i.e., the dispersed smaller
creditors). It classified them separately, and although the plan
distribution section was careful to provide them with the same
recovery, at least facially, the rest of the plan ensured that they were
actually “treated” differently. Specifically, §§ .07 and 4.09 of the plan
provided that holders in the trade committee class and holders of
other general unsecured claims would each receive “(i) 7.14 shares of
New Common Stock for each one thousand ($1,000) dollars of such
holder’s [allowed claim] and (ii) Cash in an amount equal to .1785
323
multiplied by the Allowed amount of such [claim].”

320. See Worldcom, 2003 WL 2386198, at *24 (describing the plan process after the
Senior Debt Claims holders voted to approve a contribution to the Ad Hoc Trade
Claims Committee which included having all of the other classes reconsider their
vote because all impaired classes have to vote on a plan that would discriminate
against one class).
321. See id. at *49 (outlining the voting process where members of voting classes
received a supplement of information regarding the treatment of the various
unsecured claims, including the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee, and determining
that the supplement supplied adequate information for all voting members to decide
whether to accept or reject the plan including the contribution).
322. For example, a creditor might believe that it is unfair to provide extra
consideration to certain large creditors in a class, simply because they are large and
have the money and ability to hire counsel to stage a noisy, difficult objection. See id.
at *17 (describing the voting procedures where more than one-half in number of
claims voted in favor of the settlement, leaving some claims not in favor of the
settlement).
323. WorldCom Plan, October 21, 2003 (the “WorldCom Plan”), §§ 4.07, 4.09.
Section 4.08 of the WorldCom Plan concerned the treatment of another class of
general unsecured claims—the “MCI Pre-Merger Claims,” whose recovery was also
heavily disputed and resolved by settlement. The treatment of that class is irrelevant
for this analysis.
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The additional recovery to holders of the trade committee claims
was achieved through a different means. The “treatment” section for
classes deemed to contribute provided for a recovery but added:
provided, however, that the acceptance of the Plan by [the class]
shall constitute an agreement by the holders of [allowed claims in
the class] to contribute to the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade
Claims Committee on a pro rata basis New Notes in an aggregate
principal amount of $[X] out of the aggregate distribution
provided to the holders of [allowed claims in the class], which
contributions shall be distributed as set forth in Section 6.06 of the
324
Plan.

Section 6.12 of the WorldCom Plan further suggested that the
distribution was being made under the plan: “The distributions of
the contributions to the members of the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims
Committee, pursuant to sections 4.12 and 4.13 of the Plan shall be
distributed by the Disbursing Agent in the manner, and in such
amounts, as determined by the Ad Hoc MCI Trade Claims
325
Committee.”
When a secured creditor “gifts” a recovery that would concededly
go to such creditor, it might be fair to say that the recovery should
326
not be considered “estate property.”
In WorldCom, in contrast, the
recovery “gifted” by the bondholders was not necessarily a recovery
the debtors were required to give to them. Rather, the recovery
consisted of property of the debtors remaining after paying all
327
secured claims. The debtors could have divided those proceeds in
numerous ways among its unsecured classes, not all of which would
have resulted in the gifting classes receiving those proceeds. As such,
these proceeds appear more like estate property than the recoveries
gifted by secured creditors in the majority of the cases following
328
SPM.
324. Id. §§ 4.12, 4.13. The amount of the contribution of New Notes to the
members of the ad hoc trade committee was $21.2 million in principal amount by
holders of the MCI senior bonds and $19 million in principal amount by holders of
the MCI junior bonds. Id.
325. Id. § 6.06.
326. In reality, even the property in which a secured creditor has a valid first
priority lien is property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (listing an all-embracing definition of property of the
estate created after filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
327. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, at *22-23 (evaluating the contribution to
the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee as a reduction in the recovery of the secured
creditors after the secured creditors were paid in full according to the plan).
328. See In re Sentry Operating Co. of Tex., Inc., 264 B.R. 850, 863-64 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2001) (rejecting a plan that called for a 99% distribution to one class of
unsecured creditors and a 1% distribution to the other class because it violated the
Unfair Discrimination Rule, and determining that this distribution of assets from a
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In addition, arguments may be made that WorldCom took SPM too
far, because the gift could not have been made outside of the plan.
Specifically, the MCI bondholders could not have made the
contribution outside of the plan without unanimous consent of all
the bondholders. It was only because of the unique Chapter 11 plan
provisions allowing a vote of one-half in number and two-thirds in
amount to force a recovery on a dissenting minority that the deal with
329
the objecting trade creditors was able to be accomplished. Without
the benefit of the plan process, perhaps the largest bondholders
would have agreed to make the distribution to the objecting trade
committee on their own outside of the plan process. Similarly,
without the benefits of SPM, the gift would have had to have been
made to all trade creditors similarly situated with the Ad Hoc Trade
330
committee.
The combination of the SPM doctrine and the plan
process enabled the larger parties negotiating to spread the cost of
resolving the objection among all bondholders, but limit the benefit
of the contribution to the actual objecting parties.
While one might argue that this unfairly benefits those creditors
who have the money and power to file and litigate a difficult
objection, without the arrangement being sanctioned by the
bankruptcy court, it is uncertain whether an agreement could have
been reached at all, as it would undoubtedly have been much more
expensive, perhaps prohibitively so, to pay all trade creditors the
331
“asking price” of the objecting trade creditors.
It is also very
important to note that, as is common in the gifting cases, the
“objecting class,” the trade creditors not on the trade committee,
332
fared no worse as a result of the gift.
As such, it appears that the
expansive use of SPM was not prejudicial to anyone and was
beneficial to the plan process and the goal of Chapter 11, which is a
consensual Chapter 11 plan. It allowed for creative plan drafting and
lien is part of the estate property).
329. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c), (f) (2000) (deeming an unimpaired class to accept
the plan in total if one-half in number of creditors and the holders of two-thirds
amount in claims accept the plan).
330. See In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1312 (1st Cir. 1993) (ruling that a
creditor can distribute it’s own dividends however it wants as long as it does not pay
nonpriority creditors ahead of priority creditors).
331. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, *47 (discussing the strong position of the
Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee because they had “unique reliance claims” that
differentiated their need for distribution from other unsecured creditors, and
allowing for an amended plan that put the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee in a
better position).
332. See id. at *5 (describing the plan that divided Class 6 into 6A which were premerger claims and 6B which were the Ad Hoc Trade Claims Committee claims, but
elaborating that each member of the two classes would receive the same treatment
under the plan: 7.14 shares of new stock and a cash payout).
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negotiations that enabled the parties to avoid a long, costly, and
protracted confirmation battle and paved the way for a much earlier
emergence from Chapter 11 for WorldCom than would otherwise
333
have been possible.
This inured to the benefit of all stakeholders
and the debtor.
b. Cases rejecting selective gifting
Faced with similar facts to those in WorldCom, the court in In re
334
335
Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, Inc. came to a different conclusion.
Specifically, the Sentry Court held that a secured creditor’s “gifting” a
distribution under a plan of reorganization to one class but not
another of equal priority is insufficient to overcome an objection by
the rejecting class contending that the plan violates the Unfair
336
Discrimination Prohibition.
In Sentry, the debtors and the secured creditor jointly proposed a
plan that paid the class of unsecured trade creditors 100% of their
claims, while other unsecured creditors would receive only 1% of
337
their claims.
The less favored creditor class rejected the plan and
creditors in the class objected to the plan on the basis that it
discriminated unfairly in violation of § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy
338
Code.
The secured creditor argued that the uneven distributions
were not “unfair discrimination,” because the secured creditor was
giving up part of its entitlement in order to pay the trade creditor
class, and the less favored class would not receive any distribution if
the secured creditor merely foreclosed on its liens and security
339
interests.

333. See generally Paul Davidson, WorldCom’s Black Cloud About to Lift, USA TODAY,
Apr. 19, 2004, at 1B (discussing WorldCom’s “astonishing” emergence out of
Chapter 11 after being under it for twenty-one months despite the $11 billion
accounting fraud when the average bankruptcy filing lasts thirty months).
334. 264 B.R. 850, 853 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001).
335. See id. at 853 (determining that a plan did not draw the classes narrowly
enough to overcome the statutory requirement of fair and equitable distribution).
336. See id. at 864 (ruling that there was no justification for discrimination that
resulted in a ninety-nine percent pay differential between equally situated classes).
337. See id. at 855-56 (noting that most creditors in Class 3 had small claims and
were mostly national entities and Class 4 included smaller creditors who would only
get 1 percent of their claims paid out).
338. See id. at 859, 863 (discussing the purpose of the Unfair Discrimination
Prohibition to ensure equal treatment, but that does not mean that some
discrimination is impermissible because not all creditors are situated equally all the
time).
339. See id. at 862-64 (detailing the secured creditors’ argument which was
premised on the fact that they had a lien on all assets, so the disfavored class had no
legal right to complain about the distribution).
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The court rejected the argument and held that the plan
340
The court held that MCorp. was
discriminated unfairly.
distinguishable, because it did not involve payments to a class of
creditors under a plan; rather it involved a settlement, albeit through
341
confirmation of a plan.
The court further noted that a “secured
[creditor] cannot simply purchase the assent of an unsecured class by
342
giving up part of its claim.”
The court reasoned that, although the secured creditor could have
foreclosed on the collateral and used the proceeds as it wished
without regard to the requirements of section 1129, the decision to
use the “powerful equitable tools” in a Chapter 11 reorganization
results in a price to be paid, namely
negotiation to win over the acceptance of an impaired class and
treatment of all non-accepting classes fairly, equitably, and without
unfair discrimination. [The secured creditor] proposes to obtain
the benefit of equitable tools without paying the price. The statute
has no provision for that, and the Court is unwilling to read these
343
requirements out of the Code.

Important to the court was a view that “[i]n general, the
Bankruptcy Code is premised on the rule of equality of
treatment. Creditors with claims of equal rank are entitled to
344
The Sentry court would not have likely
equal distribution.
approved the distribution scheme in WorldCom. Perhaps the
different result in these two cases can be attributed to the
possibility that had the court not approved the deal in WorldCom,
the case might have lingered in litigation over substantive
consolidation for years, causing serious damage to the debtors,
340. See id. at 864 (using the “Markell” test to determine that the plan proponents
did not overcome the presumption of unfair discrimination because the plan seemed
to pay the class of national creditors for “reasons other than preservation of value” of
the plan).
341. See id. at 863 (further distinguishing Mcorp. by pointing out that the court
never addressed the priorities between the FDIC and the junior bondholders).
342. Id. at 864.
343. Id. at 866. The court appeared to worry about allowing what it viewed to be
exceptions to the Chapter 11 plan requirements:
To accept [the secured creditor’s] argument that a secured lender can,
without any reference to fairness, decide which creditors get paid and how
much those creditors get paid, is to reject the historical foundation of equity
receiverships and to read the § 1129(b) requirements out of the Code. If the
argument were accepted with respect to § 1129(b) ‘unfair discrimination
requirement,’ there is no logical reason not to apply it to the § 1129(b) ‘fair
and equitable’ requirement [i.e., the Absolute Priority Rule], or to the
§ 1129(a)(10) requirement that at least one class has accepted the plan. To
accept that argument is simply to start down a slippery slope that does great
violence to history and to positive law.
Id. at 865.
344. Id. at 863.
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their estates, and all parties in interest. In contrast, in Sentry, the
court may have believed the plan would have been easily
confirmed without “unfairly” paying trade creditors or if the
secured creditor agreed to provide a similar contribution to all
unsecured creditors.
Similar to Sentry, but unlike WorldCom, the court in In re Snyders
345
Drug Stores, Inc., held that a plan discriminated unfairly against an
objecting class of unsecured creditors by providing a distribution only
346
to other classes of unsecured creditors.
As part of the plan, the
secured creditor agreed “to allow some of the money that it
believe[d] would otherwise be paid on its secured claim to instead be
347
set aside and paid to two junior classes of unsecured creditors.” As
a result, the unsecured creditors in Class 10 (generally trade creditors
with whom the reorganized debtor intended to do business and
lessors of stores it intended to continue to operate) would receive
$3.75 million in cash, excess from a reclamation fund, and recoveries
348
from preserved litigation claims.
In contrast, Class 12, which
349
consisted of other lessor claims, would receive nothing.
The court rejected the proponents’ argument that the distribution
to the unsecured creditors was not property of the estate, but
constituted an agreement by the senior secured creditor to share
350
some of its recovery with other creditors. The court noted first that,
because the distribution included recoveries from preserved litigation
claims (presumably not subject to the secured creditor’s liens), the
distribution is property of the estate and must be made in accordance
351
with the Bankruptcy Code.
The court held that SPM was
distinguishable because (1) it dealt with property that was not
property of the estate and (2) it concerned an agreement that “was
not proposed as part of a plan of reorganization, but was instead in
the nature of a partial assignment or subordination agreement that
352
The
was not subject to the code’s confirmation requirements.”
345. 307 B.R. 889 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004).
346. See id. at 891 (outlining the objections to the reorganization plan of a drug
store chain that included an unfair discrimination claim and an Absolute Priority
Rule violation, and upholding the unfair discrimination claim).
347. Id. at 892.
348. See id. (explaining that the $3.75 million is a six to seven percent distribution
of the recovery to the secured creditor, and noting that another class of unsecured
creditors with reclamation claims will get a twenty-seven percent distribution).
349. See id. (recognizing that this class consisted of landlords that had claims
arising from lease rejections of nonresidential real property and personal property).
350. Id. at 894.
351. See id. (using 11 U.S.C. § 541 to determine that recoveries from preserved
litigation claims is by statute part of the estate and therefore must be distributed as
part of the reorganization plan).
352. Id. at 896 n.11.
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court was not clear about whether it would have allowed the gifting
had the recoveries to Class 10 been clearly out of funds that would
353
Unlike the WorldCom
otherwise have gone to secured creditors.
court, the Snyders court appeared to have a fundamental problem
with the use of an SPM gifting scenario to overcome the Bankruptcy
354
Code’s Chapter 11 cramdown confirmation requirements. As such,
like the court in Sentry, it is unlikely that the court in Snyders would
have approved the WorldCom Plan. Again, it is possible that the
court in Snyders believed that under the facts of that case, unlike in
WorldCom, by rejecting the proposed deal, a new, “more fair” deal
355
could easily be reached.
5. Rejection of use of SPM for improper ends
Other than Sentry and Snyder, the latter of which is not as strong as
356
the former, courts that have rejected the use of SPM to circumvent
the confirmation requirements of a Chapter 11 plan have generally
done so only when faced with particularly nefarious attempts by
parties to favor certain parties over others rather than an attempt to
“get a deal done.”
357
For example, in In re CGE Shattuk, LLC, the court held that a
secured creditor cannot offer to pay some unsecured creditors to
reject a plan and force a Chapter 7 conversion to circumvent the
358
requirements of confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.
In CGE, the
359
debtor and the secured creditor filed competing Chapter 11 plans.
The secured creditor thereafter withdrew its plan and, in an effort to
obtain rejection of the debtor’s plan, offered to give certain creditors
353. See id. at 895 (focusing the analysis of Class 10 on the fact that it included
lessors just like Class 12, and there was no reasonable basis for the discrimination
between the lessors in Class 10 and the lessors in Class 12 because the Class was not
narrowly tailored to the goals of the plan).
354. See id. at 894-96 (relying on a four-factor test to determine whether the
discrimination was unfair instead of relying on SPM: (1) is there a reasonable basis
for the discrimination, (2) whether the plan can be achieved without the
discrimination, (3) whether the discrimination is in good faith, and (4) how the
discriminated class is treated).
355. See id. at 895-96 (noting that under the current plan the discriminated class
has no meaningful opportunity for recovery because it does not get any distribution,
and that the plan can be confirmed without the discrimination).
356. One could limit Sentry to its facts because of the court’s expressed concern
that the recovery being “gifted” did not actually belong to (i.e., was not subject to the
lien of) the secured creditor.
357. 254 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000).
358. See id. at 13 (denying the plan of the debtor and secured creditor to pay
portions of the recovery because the disclosure was an attempt to subvert the
Chapter 11 provisions).
359. See id. at 7 (explaining that the secured creditor filed a second plan because it
felt that the debtor’s plan would not be confirmed by all creditors, and the secured
creditor wanted to maximize the value of the debtor’s assets).
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a payment if, by a certain date, the secured creditor was either
360
granted relief from the stay or the case was converted to Chapter 7.
Patently, the secured creditor was seeking to buy the support of such
361
creditors to block the reorganization efforts of the debtor.
Citing SPM, the secured creditor, “NCC,” argued that it should be
permitted to pay anyone it wished out of the proceeds of its
362
collateral.
The bankruptcy court rejected this argument and held
that SPM was distinguishable because it involved a formally executed
agreement between a secured creditor and the creditors’ committee
that specifically called for the parties to work toward negotiating a
plan of reorganization and to work cooperatively to maximize the
value of the debtor’s estate as well as assure a return to general
363
unsecured creditors.
The court noted that, while the secured creditor’s commitment was
somewhat similar to a Chapter 11 plan, it was an attempt to avoid the
requirements of Chapter 11 associated with plan proposal and
confirmation, including: (1) classification of claims (11 U.S.C.
§ 1122), (2) equality of treatment of members of the same class (11
U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4)), and (3) confirmation standards (11 U.S.C.
364
§ 1129).
“In effect, by withdrawing the NCC amended plan, and
making minor changes to the NCC Commitment [to make a
distribution to certain creditors], NCC seeks to obtain for itself the
economic benefits of the withdrawn plan without complying with the
365
requirements for confirming a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.”
The court noted specifically that the distribution scheme enacted by
the secured creditor’s proposal would permit different treatment of
creditors in the same class in violation of section 1123(a)(4) of the
366
Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, “[e]ven assuming that the
360. See id. at 8-9 (recognizing that the secured creditor withdrew its propose plan
but filed a commitment to pay fifty percent of the claims to certain creditors if they
were granted the stay or the case was converted to Chapter 7).
361. See id. at 9 (taking note that the amended commitment to pay the fifty
percent dividend was a clear inducement for the unsecured creditors to reject the
debtor’s plan in favor of the fifty percent dividend).
362. See id. at 10 (disregarding the label the secured creditor put on its proposal
(a plan to pay collateral), and stating that the substance of a proposal determines
whether the proposal is a distribution of collateral or a reorganization plan).
363. See id. at 10-11 (noting that, in the current case, there was no formal
agreement and no commitment to generate a joint plan).
364. See id. at 10 (defining a plan of reorganization as a plan that is an offer by a
party in interest to make a distribution to creditors and subject to confirmation by
the creditors and then approval by the bankruptcy plan, and noting that the secured
creditor’s commitment is a plan that is an offer of a party in interest to make a
distribution but it is not subject to the requirements of a plan of reorganization
under Chapter 11).
365. Id. at 13.
366. See id. at 11 (elaborating that the commitment is a reorganization plan
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differences between the facts of SPM and this case are not pertinent,
the decision in SPM is not authority for the proposition that parties in
a bankruptcy proceeding may avoid the requirements of the
367
Bankruptcy Code by private agreement.”
368
Similarly, the court in In re Goffena refused to uphold an
agreement between a secured creditor and a Chapter 7 trustee under
which the secured creditor would allocate and pay the Chapter 7
trustee’s fees from the collateral proceeds while other administrative
369
and priority claimants would not be satisfied. The court held that
SPM was inapposite, because unlike SPM, despite making the
payment from the bank’s collateral, the property in Goffena remained
370
property of the estate.
The bankruptcy court reasoned that the
secured creditor had withdrawn its motion for stay relief and,
therefore, the encumbered property constituted property of the
371
estate.
Accordingly, the proceeds thereof “came into the
bankruptcy estate to be distributed according to the provisions of the
372
Bankruptcy Code, including Sections 506(c) and 726.”
The court
also held that the purportedly gifted amount to the Chapter 7 trustee
was not an assignment or subordination of the secured creditor’s sale
proceeds to a creditor, but was a payment to the “estate to facilitate its
373
interests in a quick sale at a favorable market price.”
The court
concluded that “[h]aving so rewarded the estate (and not the Trustee
individually, for the Trustee is a fiduciary for the estate), the sum

because the economic substance of the plan effectuates the same result as a Chapter
11 plan while directly subverting the requirements of Chapter 11, and refusing to
permit a plan that is clearly against statutory requirements and controlling case law).
367. Id.
368. 175 B.R. 386 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1994).
369. See id. at 389-92 (allowing the secured creditor and the trustee to agree to an
assignment of sales proceeds, as long as the agreement was not contrary to the
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code like the current requirement).
370. See id. at 391 (further distinguishing SPM by noting that the Chapter 7 trustee
is not a creditor of the estate unlike the unsecured creditors in SPM who were
creditors of the estate of the debtor, and noting that SPM does not even involve a
determination of the priorities of estate property under the Bankruptcy Code).
371. See id. (realizing that once the motion for stay relief was abandoned, the
property remained the bank’s collateral, which is part of the estate according to the
Bankruptcy Code).
372. Id. Section 726 of the Bankruptcy Code governs the priority of distributions
in a case under Chapter 7. It provides that property of the estate is to be distributed
first to holders of claims in the priority specified in section 507 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (2000). The Goffena court also seemed bothered by the
agreement’s attempting to set the Chapter 7 trustee’s fees in circumvention of
section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code which provides for the fees to be paid to
trustees. 175 B.R. at 391.
373. Id. at 392.
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allocated for the Trustee’s fee is property of the bankruptcy estate to
374
be distributed pursuant to § 726.”
375
The bankruptcy court in In re Scott Cable Communications, Inc.
similarly rejected an attempted use of SPM to overcome the
requirements of Chapter 11. In that case the plan proposed to avoid
paying taxing claims in violation of § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy
376
Code. The plan of liquidation of Scott Cable contemplated that the
debtor’s assets would be sold pursuant to the plan of liquidation but
377
The plan provided that all administrative,
after confirmation.
priority, and general unsecured creditors would be paid from the
recoveries otherwise distributable to the subordinated secured
378
creditors.
However, the plan was structured to avoid the payment
379
of capital gains taxes attributable to the sale.
The debtor argued
that those taxes did not have to be paid under the plan, because the
380
sale would occur after confirmation.
The IRS objected to the plan. It argued, inter alia, that the plan
violated § 1129(a)(9) and encompassed a tax avoidance scheme
381
proscribed by § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The debtor
argued that SPM supported the subordinated secured creditors’ right
to pay other unsecured creditors from their distribution without
382
paying the IRS.
The court rejected the argument, noting that
“SPM[, a Chapter 7 liquidation,] is inapplicable because Chapter 7
does not require a plan and, therefore, is not subject to the
383
confirmation requirements of § 1129.”
The court concluded that,
on the facts before it, the principal purpose of the plan was avoidance

374. Id. The holding in Goffena could, however, be limited to its facts, as the court
appeared to have real concerns about the fact that the Chapter 7 trustee, while
securing payment of its own fees, failed to send notice to the taxing authorities about
the sale of collateral, which contained the agreement to pay the trustee’s fees. See id.
at 389-90.
375. 227 B.R. 596 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
376. Id. at 601, 603.
377. Id. at 598.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 599. The plan also provided that the subordinated secured creditors
and others would receive releases, including releases from any tax liability to the IRS.
Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.; cf. id. at 603 (“Section 1129(d) provides[that n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this section, on request of a party in interest that is a governmental unit,
the court may not confirm a plan if the principal purpose of the plan is the
avoidance of taxes. . . .”).
382. See id. at 603 (explaining that the debtor tried to justify its nonpayment to the
IRS on the authority of SPM).
383. Id.
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of tax liability, in violation of § 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
385
Accordingly, it denied confirmation.

384

IV. ARMSTRONG: THE PLAN, THE DECISION, AND THE IMPLICATIONS
Against the backdrop of the foregoing cases, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Armstrong was asked to decide, in the context of a
heavily litigated confirmation battle, whether the SPM doctrine could
be stretched to its extreme, but logical, limits: permitting the
deemed gifting from one class of unsecured creditors to equity
through a plan of reorganization over the objection of another class
386
The Armstrong court was unwilling to go
of unsecured creditors.
that far. It not only held that the gifting iteration in the debtor’s plan
violated the Absolute Priority Rule, but upheld the district court’s
decision, which suggested that lesser iterations were also
387
impermissible, despite decisions by other courts.
A. The Armstrong Plan
Armstrong World Industries Inc. (“Armstrong”) and its subsidiaries
design, manufacture, and sell flooring products, kitchen and
388
bathroom cabinets, and ceiling systems around the world.
Armstrong commenced its Chapter 11 case in 2000 after being
bombarded with asbestos-related personal injury and wrongful death
389
claims.
The United States Trustee appointed three separate
creditors’ committees pursuant to § 1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code:
the official or statutory committee of unsecured creditors (the
“Unsecured Creditors”), the official committee of asbestos personal
injury claimants (the “Asbestos PI Claimants”), and the official
390
The asbestos
committee of asbestos property damage claimants.

384. Id. at 604. Scott Cable can likely be limited to its facts because court held that
if the sale of the collateral were to occur outside of bankruptcy, or before plan
confirmation, or in the plan itself, the tax liability resulting would be so substantial as
to deny any recovery to the subordinated secured creditors. Id. at 603. As such, the
subordinated secured creditors were not actually entitled to the recovery being
provided to them under the plan and which they sought to use to pay other
creditors.
385. Id.
386. See generally In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507
(3d Cir. 2005).
387. See infra Part IV.B (describing the district court and court of appeal’s
decision).
388. Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 509.
389. Id.; Brief of Appellant Armstrong World Indus., Inc. at 7, In re Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 05-1881)).
390. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.(Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 525 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2005).
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property damage claimants committee was disbanded during the
391
Chapter 11 case.
After extended negotiation, Armstrong reached an agreement with
its committees on the terms of a plan of reorganization and filed its
392
Fourth Amended Plan of Reorganization (the “Armstrong Plan”).
The Armstrong Plan included the following classes and projected
recoveries, among others:
Class 6—Unsecured Creditors
(approximate 59.5% recovery), Class 7—Asbestos PI [Personal
Injury] Claimants (approximate 20% recovery), Class 12—Equity
Interest Holder (New Warrants valued at approximately $35 million
393
to $40 million).
The only equity interest holder of Armstrong is
Armstrong’s parent company, Armstrong Worldwide, Inc., which is,
394
in turn, wholly owned by Armstrong Holdings, Inc.
If the
Armstrong Plan would be confirmed and consummated, the New
Warrants ultimately would be distributed to the public shareholders
of Armstrong Holdings, Inc.
Recognizing that a recovery to the equity holder would violate the
Absolute Priority Rule unless all classes of creditors voted to accept
the Armstrong Plan, the plan provided for a contingent alternative if
Class 6 rejected it. If Class 6 voted to reject the Armstrong Plan, the
New Warrants would be distributed to the holders of Class 7 claims,
who would then be deemed, by virtue of voting to accept the
Armstrong Plan, to have waived the right to receive the New Warrants
395
and to agree to contribute such warrants to the equity holder.
Specifically, § 3.2(1) of the Armstrong Plan provided:
On or as soon as practicable after the Effective Date, Reorganized
AWI shall issue the New Warrants in respect of the Equity Interests
in AWI as provided in section 7.24 hereof; provided, however, that, if
Class 6 votes to reject the Plan, no distribution shall be made under
the Plan from AWI’s estate in respect of the Equity Interests in AWI
but, in such event, Reorganized AWI shall issue the New Warrants
as provided in section 7.24 hereof in respect of the Asbestos
Personal Injury Claims and in accordance with section 10.1(b)
396
hereof.

Further, § 10.1(b) of the Armstrong Plan provided
In addition, if Class 6 has voted to reject the Plan, the New
Warrants shall be issued by Reorganized AWI on account of the
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 525 n.4.
Id. at 525.
In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509.
Id.
Id.
In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 526 n.7.
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Asbestors Personal Injury Claims; however, such claimants have
waived on behalf of themselves and the Asbestos PI Trust any right
to the New Warrants. The New Warrants shall be issued by
Reorganized AWI to AWWD (or to Holdings as the successor to
AWWD under the Holdings Plan of Liquidation), consistent with
section 7.24 hereof (and shall never be issued or delivered to the
Asbestors PI Trust), without any action being required of, or any
direction by, the Asbestos PI Trust or the Asbestos PI Trustees in
397
such regard.

Although the Unsecured Creditors had negotiated and supported
the Armstrong Plan, it could not bind the individual unsecured
398
creditors.
In addition, the committee began to have reservations
about the advantages of the Armstrong Plan to Unsecured Creditors
399
as the voting deadline approached. The reason for the Unsecured
Creditors’ change in course was that the Senate Judiciary Committee
had approved legislation, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution
400
Act (the “FAIR Act”), and the Committee believed that the FAIR
Act might be enacted in the very near future. If that occurred,
Armstrong’s liability for asbestos injury claimants would be reduced
401
making more money available for unsecured creditors. As a result,
402
the parties obtained an extension of the voting deadline. However,

397. Id. at 526 n.8.
398. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509 (explaining that, because
the plan would issue the new warrants to AWI’s equity interest holders without fully
satisfying the claims of the unsecured creditors, all “impaired” unsecured creditors
were required to approve the plan under section 1129(a)(8)).
399. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 527.
400. Id. at 527-28.
401. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510. Specifically, the FAIR Act
would provide an
exclusive administrative forum for addressing asbestos claims . . . [and]
would create a no-fault, administrative compensation system for asbestos
claims that would replace civil litigation in the state and federal courts. A
claims process under the supervision of the United States Court of Federal
Claims would determine eligibility for compensation, and eligible claimants
would be paid from a Fund financed by contributions from insurers and
from defendant companies.
In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 527-28 (quoting Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos
Litigation in the 21st Century/Asbestos Legislation: Federal and State, SJ031 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
549, 556 (2003)). It appears that the creditors’ committee believed that Armstrong’s
contribution to the trust created as a result of the FAIR Act would be less than its
payout to the personal injury claimants in class 7, resulting in more assets in the
estate to be distributed to general unsecured creditors. Armstrong’s mandatory
contribution to the trust created by FAIR was estimated to range from $520 million
to $805 million, while Armstrong’s contribution to such a trust under the plan was
over $1.8 billion in cash, notes, and common stock in the reorganized debtor. In re
Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510.
402. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510.
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neither the debtor nor the court was willing to extend the date of the
403
hearing to consider confirmation of the Armstrong Plan.
As of the voting deadline, all impaired classes voted to accept the
404
Armstrong Plan, except Class 6. Although the requisite majority of
Class 6 claims in number voted to accept the plan (88.03%), less than
the requisite two-thirds in amount of Class 6 claims voted to accept
405
the plan (23.21%).
In addition, the Unsecured Creditors filed a
timely objection to the Armstrong Plan, arguing, among other things,
that (1) the Armstrong Plan should not be confirmed until the fate of
the FAIR Act was determined, and (2) the Armstrong Plan could not
be confirmed over their objection, as it could not satisfy the
406
cramdown requirements of § 1129(b).
B. Court Rejection of the Armstrong Plan
After an extended hearing, the bankruptcy court issued proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposed confirmation
order, and a recommendation to the district court that the
Unsecured Creditors’ objection be overruled and the Armstrong Plan
407
be confirmed.
The Unsecured Creditors filed at the district court
403. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 528 & n.10. In any event, as noted by
the district court, “[w]hile both the parties’ perceptions of whether legislation would
help or hinder their respective positions and of the likelihood that the legislation
would be enacted may have influenced their decision to support or oppose the Plan,
these political calculations have no bearing on the legal issues before the Court.” Id.
at 528.
404. See id. at 528 (recounting that Classes 3, 7, and 12 voted to accept the plan,
while Class 6 voted to reject it).
405. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000)
(“A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has been accepted by creditors . . .
that hold at least two third in amount and more than one-half in number of the
allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such
plan.”).
406. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (stating that the Unsecured
Creditors’ objection was based on (1) the perceived consequences of the proposed
FAIR Act, and (2) the applicability of the Absolute Priority Rule).
407. Id. The bankruptcy court indicated that because the plan included a
channeling injunction under § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, it did not have
jurisdiction to enter a final order confirming the plan; rather, it could only issue
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. Brief of
Appellee Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Armstrong World Indus., Inc. et
al., at 11, In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 051881) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A) (2000) (providing that a channeling
injunction shall be valid if an order confirming the plan “was issued or affirmed by
the district court that has jurisdiction over the reorganization case”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c)(1), which states:
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by
the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings
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objections to the bankruptcy court’s findings, conclusions, and
408
After holding a hearing, the district court
recommendation.
denied confirmation, holding that the Plan violated the Absolute
409
410
Priority Rule. The Third Circuit affirmed.
The Third Circuit began its statutory construction and analysis by
referring to the words of the statute, noting that “[i]f the meaning is
plain, we will make no further inquiry unless the literal application of
the statute will end in a result that conflicts with Congress’s
411
The court stressed that the intentions of Congress
intentions.”
412
control.
The court then stated that the plain language of the
statute made it clear that “a plan cannot give property to junior
claimants over the objection of a more senior class that is impaired,”
and that nothing in the legislative history demonstrates that such
413
plain meaning conflicts with Congress’s intent.
The Court of Appeals then rejected Armstrong’s argument that the
gifting provided for in the plan is permissible under the precedents
established in SPM, MCorp., and Genesis. Without much explanation,
the appellate court adopted the district court’s interpretation of
those cases and agreed that “they do not stand for the unconditional
proposition that creditors are generally free to do whatever they wish
414
with the bankruptcy proceeds they receive.”
The district court had addressed those cases in a section entitled
“Cases That Do Not Strictly Apply Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) Are
415
Distinguishable or Wrongly Decided.” After a detailed discussion of
SPM, the court held that SPM was inapposite to the Armstrong Plan
for various reasons. First, SPM occurred in a Chapter 7 case, where
416
the Absolute Priority Rule does not apply.
Second, because SPM
involved a secured creditor with a perfected, first priority lien in
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any
party has timely and specifically objected.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
408. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II, 432 F.3d at 510).
409. Id. at 510-11.
410. Id. at 518.
411. Id. at 512.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 513. Armstrong had argued that the statements of the bill’s sponsors
that a senior creditor shall not be able to give up consideration to a junior class over
the objection of an “intervening class” meant that gifting was proper when a senior
class gives up consideration to a junior class over the objection of a co-equal (rather
than intervening) class. Id. The court rejected this argument as contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute and to other statements in the legislative history. See id.
(concluding that the plain language of the statute and legislative history do “not
indicate that the objecting class must be an intervening class”).
414. Id. at 514.
415. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. 523, 537 (3d Cir. 2005).
416. Id. at 538.
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almost all of the debtor’s assets, which were sold, the proceeds were
not subject to distribution under the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
417
The district court
scheme (section 726 for Chapter 7 cases).
disagreed with those courts that have held that the collateral security
418
of secured creditors is not property of the estate.
Third, the sharing agreement in SPM was akin to an ordinary
419
carveout.
“Unlike the Debtor in the instant case, the secured
lender in SPM had a substantive right to dispose of its property,
including the right to share the proceeds subject to its lien with other
420
classes.”
The district court also distinguished WorldCom, Genesis, and MCorp.
It noted accurately that WorldCom involved distributions between
classes of equal priority (a question of the Unfair Discrimination
421
Prohibition), which did not implicate the Absolute Priority Rule.
This is a weak distinction, because either a gift or transfer of value
from one creditor class to another constitutes plan treatment or it
does not. If it does, as the Armstrong court appears to believe, then
such a gift would implicate the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition just
as much as it would implicate the Absolute Priority Rule. The
WorldCom court apparently believed such a gift did not constitute
plan treatment and, therefore, did not implicate either the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition or the Absolute Priority Rule.
The court distinguished Genesis asserting that the distribution to
equity holders through the management incentive plan involved an
422
acceptable carveout from the secured creditor’s recovery.

417. Id. at 538 & n.29.
418. See id. at 538 (reasoning that the agreement between the secured lender and
the unsecured creditors involved property of the estate). The court cited § 541 of
the Bankruptcy Code, id. at 538 n.28, which defines property of the estate to include
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000). The court was correct, as even SPM noted
that property subject to the secured lender’s lien is property of the estate until that
property is distributed to the secured lender. See Official, Unsecured Creditors
Comm. v. Stern (In re SPM Mfg. Corp.), 984 F.2d 1305, 1313 (1st Cir. 1993) (where
the court stated:
In this case, the proceeds of the sale of SPM’s assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 363 were property of the estate and thus the Code governed their use and
distribution. However, once the court lifted the automatic stay and ordered
those proceeds distributed to [the secured creditor] in proper satisfaction of
its lien, that money became property of [the secured creditor], not of the
estate).
419. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at 538-39.
420. Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
421. Id.
422. See id. (reasoning that because the property distributed to the junior class in
Genesis was subject to senior lenders’ liens, it did not violate the Absolute Priority
Rule) (citing Genesis, 266 B.R. 591, 617-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)).
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The court’s distinction of MCorp. was even weaker, noting that the
distribution approved in that case was made “to fund settlement of
423
pre-petition litigation between the debtor and a third party.” After
spending pages describing the importance of a strict application of
the Absolute Priority Rule, the district court in Armstrong did not
adequately justify why a diversion of consideration to junior
stakeholders to resolve litigation is an appropriate exception to the
Absolute Priority Rule while a gift from another creditor is not.
Apparently recognizing that its distinctions of the above cases were
weak, the district court in Armstrong suggested that those cases are
wrongly decided. According to the court,
to the extent that In re WorldCom, In re Genesis Health Ventures, and In
re MCorp Financial read SPM to stand for the unconditional
proposition that ‘creditors are generally free to do whatever they
wish with the bankruptcy dividends they receive, including sharing
them with other creditors, so long as recoveries received under the
plan are not impacted,’ . . . without adherence to the strictures of
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), that contention is flatly rejected
424
here.

The both the district and circuit courts in Armstrong unequivocally
rejected the strong policy arguments in favor of permitting the
structure in the Armstrong Plan to enable the reorganization of
Armstrong and its emergence from Chapter 11. According to the
district court, “no amount of legal creativity or counsel’s incantation
to general notions of equity or to any supposed policy favoring
reorganizations . . . supports judicial rewriting of the Bankruptcy
425
Code.”
The Court of Appeals endorsed the district court’s flat
rejection of a liberal construction of the Bankruptcy Code in order to
426
achieve its objective of successful business reorganization. It added
its own death blow to liberal construction, stating that “[a]llowing
this particular type of transfer would encourage parties to
impermissibly sidestep the carefully crafted strictures of the
Bankruptcy Code, and would undermine Congress’s intention to give
427
unsecured creditors bargaining power in this context.”

423. Id.
424. Id. at 539-40 (quoting WorldCom, 2003 WL 23861928, *59, 174-75 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2003); citing In re Sentry Operating Co., 264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2001); citing In re Snyders Drug Stores, Inc., 307 B.R. 889, 896 n.11 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2004)).
425. Id. at 540.
426. Cf. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, 514 (3d
Cir. 2005) (adopting the district court’s interpretation of SPM, Genesis, and Mcorp.).
427. Id. at 514-15.
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C. The Danger of the Armstrong Decision
The Third Circuit’s decision was wrong both from a statutory and
policy perspective. The bottom line is that no one would have been
harmed by the proposed gifting in Armstrong. The rejecting class was
not entitled to the value that was to be transferred to the equity
holder. As a result, it should have had no right to hold up
confirmation on the basis of the value being provided by one class to
another. Under the Armstrong Plan that was denied confirmation,
the Class 6 Unsecured Creditors were going to receive a distribution
428
worth approximately 59.5% of their claims. If Armstrong amended
its plan based upon the Third Circuit’s decision and removed the gift
of the warrants to equity absent a different agreement among the
parties, Class 6 would receive approximately 59.5% of its claims—the
429
exact same amount as originally proposed.
Significantly, Class 6 would have no basis under which to object to
the warrants being distributed to and retained by Class 7. This is
because under the plan, Class 7 is estimated to recover twenty
430
percent of its claims.
If Class 7 kept the warrants, the recovery to
431
Class 7 would still be well under thirty percent —substantially less
than the nearly sixty percent recovery being provided to the equal

428. Id. at 509.
429.
In fact, after the Armstrong II decision, the district court entered a
scheduling order, dated February 8, 2006 (the “Armstrong Scheduling Order”)
(upon joint motion of Armstrong, the Unsecured Creditors, the Asbestos PI
Claimants, and others) requiring Armstrong to file a modified plan by February 21,
2006 and scheduling the hearing to consider confirmation of the modified
Armstrong Plan for May 23, 2006. In re Armstrong World Indus, Inc., Chapter 11
Case No.: 00-4471 (JKF) (Bankr. D. Del.), docket # 9060. The Armstrong
Scheduling Order provided that, apart from certain technical modifications, the
Armstrong Plan “shall only be modified to delete the provisions regarding the
receipt of ‘New Warrants’ by the holders of Equity Interests in Class 12 of the
[Armstrong] Plan.” Id. It further provided that the Unsecured Creditors
acknowledge that the sole objection they will be pursuing is that the Armstrong Plan
discriminates unfairly with respect to Class 6 (by overestimating Armstrong’s asbestos
personal injury liability and thus allocating too much of its assets to Class 7). Id. The
Armstrong Scheduling Order further set forth a discovery schedule relating to the
Unsecured Creditors’ objection. Id. The district court held the confirmation
hearing on May 23-25, 2006. Subsequent to the hearing, on May 30, 2006, the
district court entered a post-trial scheduling order requiring the parties to submit
post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by certain dates
and ordering that closing arguments shall be held on July 11, 2006. Id. Therefore,
as of the date of the publication of this Article, a chapter 11 plan for Armstrong has
not been confirmed. Armstrong remains in chapter 11. Id.
430. Id.
431. The warrants, estimated to be worth $35 to $40 million, amounted to 1.1%1.3% of Class 7’s $3.146 billion in claims. Cf. In re Armstrong (Armstrong I), 320 B.R. at
525 (providing a figure for Class 7’s claims). Thus, if Class 7 had retained the
warrants, its recovery would have been approximately 21% of its claims.
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432

priority Class 6.
Class 6 could not, therefore, assert that the plan
violated the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition with respect to Class 6
433
(and, in fact, Class 6 conceded that point).
The facts of Armstrong demonstrate why gifting may be both
voluntary and non-prejudicial. A class that is discriminated against by
not receiving as much under the plan as a class of equal priority, has
a right to reject the plan and oppose its confirmation under the
434
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.
Class 7, therefore, could have
rejected the Armstrong Plan and opposed confirmation (regardless
of the whether or not claimants in the class received the warrants, as
they were receiving less than Class 6). Class 7 not only accepted the
435
plan, but agreed to give a portion of its own distribution to others.
The gifting structure of Armstrong was feasible because of Class 7’s
voluntary agreement to give up to the equity holder a portion of its
recovery (i.e., the warrants).
Once it is conceded that Class 7 was entitled to the warrants, it is
somewhat illogical to say that Class 7 cannot transfer those warrants
to Class 12 equity as part of the plan implementation. Clearly, a Class
7 claimant could, on its own after the plan became effective and it
received the warrants, gift them to the equity holder. If the Class 7
claimant can make that distribution at a future date, it should be
allowed to do so through the plan. To hold otherwise would be to
elevate form over substance.
Therefore, a clear and distinct conclusion can be drawn between
what is permissible and what is impermissible: if the gift is an amount
to which the gifting class is entitled (such that the objecting class is
436
no worse off as a result of the gift), it should be permitted.
The Armstrong Court’s holding either leaves professionals without
clear guidance or draws a formalistic line of demarcation: if the
transfer is after the effective date of a plan, it’s fine; if the transfer is
432. In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509.
433. Brief of Appellant, supra note 389, at 29-30.
434. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2000) (providing an impaired class with a right to
reject a plan in the confirmation process).
435. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 509-10 (explaining that if Class 7
received the warrants under the plan, it would automatically waive receipt of them,
and that Class 7 accepted the plan).
436. The answer would be different if the distribution in the hands of the gifting
class would violate the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition. Thus, in Armstrong II, the
court should have considered whether it would have been improper (due to the
Absolute Priority Rule, the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, or otherwise) for Class
7 to retain the warrants. Once the court made the determination that it would not
be improper for Class 7 to keep the distribution, it should have held that it was not
improper for Class 7 to gift the distribution—regardless of the identity of the
recipient.
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under a plan, it’s improper; if the value transferred comes from the
collateral security of a secured creditor, it’s fine; if the value
transferred is not collateral proceeds of a secured creditor, it’s
improper, etc. The Armstrong decision essentially limits the ability of
debtors and parties in interest to find ways in Chapter 11 to achieve
the mutually advantageous goal of reorganization and return to the
economic world simply because a party that does not suffer as a result is
able to assert a technical objection as to the form of the other parties’
recovery. The decision adds grist to the mill of dissidents to frustrate
the objectives of Chapter 11.
The facts in Armstrong illustrate the point.
The creditors’
committee (Class 6) was not truly opposed to equity receiving the
437
warrants—the committee had agreed to that granting of value. The
Unsecured Creditors subsequently changed their mind about the
plan, because they perceived an increase in the likelihood of the
passage of the FAIR Act, which, in their view, would have lowered the
438
recovery to Class 7 and provided Class 6 with a greater recovery, a
rationale unrelated to the transfer of value to Class 12, the equity
holder.
The Absolute Priority Rule objection raised by the
439
Unsecured Creditors appears almost as an afterthought.
The
distribution to equity had nothing to do with the reason the
Unsecured Creditors were opposed to the plan.
Had the agreement the Unsecured Creditors reached with the
other parties in Armstrong not included the distribution to equity, it
appears they still would have changed their position in the fall of
440
2003 based on the possible passage of the FAIR Act. The proposed
distribution to equity only gave the Unsecured Creditors a formal
statutory basis (pretext) on which to interpose an objection. This
reliance on the Absolute Priority Rule—to kill a way out of Chapter
11 for reasons that had nothing to do with the statutory basis for the
objection (provision of warrants to equity)—certainly has no basis in
437. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (stating that the creditors’
committee, which represented Class 6, initially approved of the plan in May 2003).
438. See supra notes 400-401 and accompanying text (explaining that, according to
the Unsecured Creditors, passage of the FAIR Act was likely because the Senate
Judiciary Committee had approved it, and Armstrong’s contribution to the trust
created by the Act would have been less than its payout to the Class 7 asbestos injury
claimants under the plan, making more money available for the Unsecured
Creditors).
439. See In re Armstrong (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d at 510 (discussing, in detail, the
anticipated effects of the FAIR Act as the unsecured creditors’ first objection to the
plan, and briefly mentioning the “possible applicability of the absolute priority rule”
as their second objection).
440. Cf. supra note 439 and accompanying text (portraying the anticipated effects
of the Fair Act as the Unsecured Creditors’ primary objection to the plan).
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the history of the development of the Absolute Priority Rule. The
result in Armstrong merely encourages dissidents to interpose
441
technical objections in order to extract hold up value.
The foregoing can be demonstrated with an example. Assume a
debtor has assets with a value of $60. The debtor has the following
creditors with the following claims: (1) Secured Class ($20), (2) Class
A ($40), and (3) Class B ($80).
This debtor is clearly insolvent. Under a typical scenario, the
debtor’s $60 of value would be allocated as follows: (1) Secured
Class—$20 (100%), (2) Class A—$13 (33%), (3) Class B—$27 (33%),
and (4) Equity—$0.
If either Class A or Class B (but not both) rejects the plan, the plan
could be confirmed over the class’ objection, as there is no unfair
discrimination (the equal priority classes are getting the same
recovery) and there is no violation of the Absolute Priority Rule (as
equity is not receiving a distribution).
Assume Class B wants equity to get a recovery. This could be for
many reasons: Class B could be the new owners of the reorganized
debtor and believe that the former shareholders (who are also the
management of the debtor) would add more value to the
reorganized enterprise if they received a recovery. Class B also could
believe that providing equity with a recovery will expedite the
debtor’s Chapter 11 case and avoid lengthy or costly litigation. The
442
reason does not really matter.
To achieve its desired outcome,

441. Of course, to take away Class 6’s leverage, Class 7 could have insisted that the
distribution of warrants to equity only occur if all impaired classes accepted the plan,
but this would not have achieved Class 7’s goal of providing a recovery to equity.
However, the result in Armstrong instructs parties such as Class 7 in the future that if
they agree to a plan providing value to equity when creditors are not paid in full,
they should make the distribution to equity conditioned on acceptance by all senior
classes so that the plan can be confirmed under § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code if
a senior class rejects it.
442. Although one could argue that the reason does matter because, for example,
value for future management is not “on account of” management’s old equity
interests. See generally supra pp. 1358-69 (discussing the New Value Corollary, an
exception to the Absolute Priority Rule that permits a distribution to equity holders
on the grounds that the distribution is not being given to them on account of their
equity interests, but for new value being contributed by them). This argument would
fail because sweat equity does not comply with the requirements of the New Value
Corollary. See supra pp. 1373-74 (explaining that in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 U.S. 197 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that the New Value Corollary does
not include a promise to contribute “labor, experience, and expertise” to the
reorganized entity).
In addition, for purposes of this example, the reason does not matter. Even if the
creditors in Class B wanted to give a distribution to certain stockholders because of
the stockholders’ beauty (and they like having beautiful shareholders), the result
should be the same.
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Class B could decide that it is willing to give $3 of its distribution of
$27 to equity.
The recoveries would now be as follows: (1) Secured Class—$20
(100%), (2) Class A—$13 (33%), (3) Class B—$24 (30%), and
(4) Equity—$3.
Class B could reject the plan and decide it does not want to make
the gift to equity. This plan could not then be confirmed. If Class B
consents, however, the plan should be confirmed, as it is clear that
Class B is voluntarily transferring value to which it is otherwise
443
entitled.
Under this scenario, to enable Class A to hold up
confirmation of the plan on the basis that it violates the Absolute
Priority Rule is counterproductive to the reorganization and the
interests of other stakeholders. Class A should be indifferent as
between the plan where equity gets a gift and the plan where equity
does not get a gift. In either case, Class A gets thirty-three percent.
Nothing in the history or the policy of the Absolute Priority Rule is
intended to protect Class A in this situation. Class A is using its
position for hold up value. It is saying: “Class B, if you want to give
equity $3, you must give us something too.” This gives Class A too
much leverage to extract value from others and delay emergence.
The same example can be used to demonstrate that the gifting
strategy cannot be abused by debtors or stockholders as some have
suggested. Assume the debtor is the party wanting to provide a
recovery for equity. Therefore, it allocates its value as follows:
(1) Secured Class—$20 (100%), (2) Class A—$12 (30%), (3) Class
B—$24 (30%), and (4) Equity—$4.
If Class A and Class B both accept the plan, then there is no issue.
The Absolute Priority Rule only applies in the cramdown situation
444
(i.e., where there is a rejecting class).
If either Class A or Class B
rejects the plan, this plan cannot be confirmed, because it would
violate the Absolute Priority Rule. Assume Class A rejects and Class B
accepts. An argument by the debtor or Class B that the distribution
was actually a gift from Class B would not work. This is because
distributing the $4 to Class B to then gift to equity would provide
Class B with a recovery of $28 (thirty-five percent). Class A could
443. Class B could do this outside of a plan. Cf. supra pp. 1344-45 (reasoning that a
class entitled to recovery under a plan could, once the plan becomes effective and it
receives its recovery, gift part of its recovery to an equity holder once, unless Class B
is widely disbursed and/or not yet even identified (for example, the Armstrong Class 7
potential asbestos personal injury claimants)).
444. See supra pp. 1355-56 (stating that because the Absolute Priority Rule is
contained § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, it only applies to nonconsensual
plans).
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then assert a meritorious objection that the distribution to Class B
violates the Unfair Discrimination Prohibition.
This example illustrates that gifting is not bound to be the norm,
because it can only be practiced as a voluntary distribution from one
group to another. No class can be forced to gift against its will, and
the objecting class should never be harmed by the gift. The gift is
inherently something that the gifting class is entitled to receive and is
445
voluntarily distributing to another party.
Arguably, this gives the
debtor too much leverage to hold up the plan process to demand a
“gift” for equity. However, this position may always be asserted by a
debtor. The debtor can always tell both classes that it may not
propose a plan that does not provide a recovery to equity. The classes
can decide to accept the plan anyway, and it can be confirmed under
§ 1129(a). Alternatively, one or more creditors may file a motion
seeking to terminate the debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan on the
basis that the debtor is using exclusivity as a sword rather than a
446
shield.
If exclusivity is terminated, any party can file a plan that
447
extinguishes equity.
445. Some might argue that the increased ability to “make a deal” is not worth the
inefficiency it introduces into the capital markets, and that the markets might have to
factor in uncertainty as to whether a claim will be diluted by a junior claim or
interest. This concern is, for the most part, misplaced. No claim is diluted unless the
class voluntarily agrees to forgo its distribution. The class can always insist on the full
amount to which it is entitled. The concern is not, however, entirely misplaced. If
gifting is readily permitted, an individual creditor could be forced, by virtue of the
democratic class voting mechanism, to gift a portion of its recovery if the majority of
the class accepts. But, once again, this situation is not unique to gifting. If all
impaired creditor classes accept a plan, equity can receive a distribution, the
minority dissenting creditors notwithstanding. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2000)
(providing that a plan should be confirmed if certain requirements are met,
including acceptance by impaired classes).
446. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is granted the exclusive right to file
a plan in the first 120 days of a Chapter 11 case. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (2000). The
period can be extended by the debtor or shortened by another party in interest for
cause. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(1) (2000). Under the recent amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, for Chapter 11 cases filed on or after October 17, 2005, the
debtor’s exclusive right to file a plan may not be extended beyond 18 months from
the entry of the order for relief. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d)(2)(A) (2005). After the
debtor’s exclusive period has terminated (or been terminated), any party in interest
can file a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2000). A finding that the debtor is using
exclusivity to pressure creditors to accede to its reorganization demands constitutes
cause for terminating exclusivity. See In re Situation Mgmt. Sys., 252 B.R. 859, 863
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (asserting that a debtor’s use of exclusivity to force creditors
to accept an otherwise unacceptable plan is one factor courts consider when
determining cause); see also In re McLean Indus., Inc., 87 B.R. 830, 834 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that courts also consider whether creditors have an
opportunity to review and negotiate an acceptable plan, and whether they are
provided with substantial financial information about any proposed plan so that they
can make an informed decision).
447. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (providing that “any party in interest” can file a plan
after the exclusivity period).
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In addition to risking loss of exclusivity, the debtor does not truly
have the power to force any class to make a gift, because that class
would necessarily, as explained above, have to accept less than that to
which it was entitled. Each class would prefer that the other class
make the gift. The result is either that no class makes the gift or that
both agree that equity gets a recovery (which, as noted, gives the
debtor or equity no greater leverage than it has under existing law to
demand a recovery for equity in a consensual plan).
The best, and perhaps the only, argument supporting the decision
in Armstrong is that the Bankruptcy Code is unambiguous and does
not permit a recovery to equity under a cramdown plan—gifting or
448
not.
The same argument could be made against the New Value
Corollary. Yet, the Supreme Court has already suggested that the
New Value Corollary to the Absolute Priority Rule has vitality, even
though it is not expressly authorized in the words of the Bankruptcy
449
Code.
Gifting should be permitted for the same reasons.
Distributions that are made on account of new value being
contributed or through gifting by other stakeholders are not really
exceptions to the Absolute Priority Rule (or the Unfair
Discrimination Prohibition); they are merely distributions outside of
the scope of those provisions. Moreover, as such distributions do not
implicate the concerns underlying the Absolute Priority Rule and the
Unfair Discrimination Prohibition, there may be no substantive
reason to disallow them. To the contrary, there are very good policy
reasons to allow these creative structures and solutions to effective
reorganization plans. Therefore, to the extent that such creativity is
If the debtor, an equity holder, or another party tries to use the gifting doctrine to
extract value in a manner constituting bad faith or that is otherwise contrary to the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, there are other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code
that can be used by others to combat such conduct. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3)
(2000) (providing that in order to confirm a plan, a court must find that the plan has
been proposed in good faith).
448. Cf. In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, 512 (3d
Cir. 2005) (applying the plain meaning of the Absolute Priority Rule to affirm the
district court’s decision to deny confirmation of the Armstrong Plan).
449. See supra pp. 1376-82 (explaining that, in Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), the Supreme Court concluded that
the New Value Corollary could arguably be implied from the language of the
Bankruptcy Code, and that if it were implied, consideration given to former equity
holders in exchange for new value would be subject to a “market” test). Moreover,
the fact that the New Value Corollary is generally accepted, see supra pp. 1376-82,
even though language explicitly setting forth the New Value Corollary was
introduced but rejected by Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, see Bank of
Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 446-47, is further proof that similar
arguments relating to the gifting doctrine are not determinative. Thus, In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc. (Armstrong II), 432 F.3d 507, should not bar its
acceptance.
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blunted by blind adherence to strict construction of the statute, a
legislative remedy should be obtained.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy negotiations are unlike any other in the sense that they
are rarely bilateral. Rather, they are multilateral, with many parties
with diverse interests pulling in different directions with the debtor
the cynosure of all parties’ attentions. Although consensus might
appear unachievable under such circumstances, the advantage of
Chapter 11 is that it creates a framework and tools that parties may
use to reach a consensus. By its nature, consensus is often a middle
ground—no party will ever walk away from the process achieving
everything it wanted. Permitting gifting of the sort approved by the
courts in MCorp., Genesis, and WorldCom (but rejected by the court in
Armstrong) opened up the boundaries within which parties could
achieve the objectives of Chapter 11 and not allow hold-outs to
dominate and possibly cause harm to the reorganization effort and
the debtor’s estate. In those extremely complicated cases, innovative
creative solutions should be applauded. It is in such situations that
bankruptcy professionals add value. The value added should be
recognized by the courts and evaluated in perspective of the policies
and objectives of Chapter 11.

